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STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: MYTH OR
REALITY AFTER SEMINOLE TRIBE OF
FLORIDA V. FLORIDA?
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."' The Amendment embodies the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity which recognizes a state as a traditional sovereign
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against
state governments brought in federal court. See San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco,
457 F. Supp. 283, 288 (S.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom. Department of Transp. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 455 U.S. 1000 (1982). See
generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.11, at 44-
54 (5th ed. 1995) (discussing the historical background of the Eleventh Amendment);
George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amend-
ment Survived the Death of the .Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hos-
pital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363 (1985) (arguing that viewing the Eleventh Amendment as
embodying state sovereignty principles best justifies the Amendment's elaborate jurispru-
dence); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sover-
eign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988) (analyzing the history of the Eleventh Amendment
in the context of appellate review); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Elev-
enth Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989) (criticizing the diversity and congres-
sional abrogation approaches to state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment);
Doyle Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54 J. AM. HIST. 19 (1967)
(discussing the history of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 (1793), in which the
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of state sovereign immunity); Gene R. Shreve, Let-
ting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L.J. 601 (1989) (discussing the state immunity
controversy in the context of the Eleventh Amendment and arguing that the Amendment
is a historical artifact).
The concept of state sovereign immunity in the United States stems from the American
political experience and in reaction to British philosophical concepts. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1430-42 (1987) (discussing the
historical developments of early Federalist concepts of sovereignty); see also THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 44 (James Madison). Sovereignty, as the British
believed, was an "indivisible, final, and unlimited power." Amar, supra, at 1430. For cen-
turies, political philosophers recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a necessary
component of stability in any political system. See RICHARD ASHCRAFr, LOCKE'S Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Urwin Hyman Ltd. 1987) (1689) (recognizing that sovereign
immunity existed in the people and the parliament); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
(Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier MacMillan Pub. 1962) (1651) (arguing that the notion of
sovereignty in government existed as a result of the social contract).
The roots of sovereignty in the British system vested in the crown and stemmed from the
belief that the King was the sovereign agent of God. See Amar, supra, at 1430-31. Later,
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entity that is immune from suit.2  Representing state sovereign immu-
nity,3 the Amendment expressly limits Article III of the Constitution, the
sovereignty evolved into a political belief, but not necessarily a religious belief, that the
King and the Parliament represented the sovereignty of their people. See id. at 1431.
In America, however, colonial leaders believed that legislative enactments were neces-
sarily limited by the higher principles of written compacts such as the Magna Carta and the
British Constitution. See id. at 1432; see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 175-98 (1967) (discussing the roots of American
constitutionalism and the effect on the concept of sovereignty). From these principles
evolved the American understanding of sovereignty and sovereign immunity. See Amar,
supra, at 1435.
2. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (holding that the language of the
Eleventh Amendment and the structure of the Constitution presupposed the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity); infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text (discussing the holding
in Hans); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)
(finding that Hans recognized the existence of state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh
Amendment); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934) (reaffirming that the Elev-
enth Amendment embodied the doctrine of state sovereign immunity); United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 645 (1892) (discussing the holding in Hans and the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity).
The historical purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect state sovereign im-
munity by insuring that private individuals would not sue states. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at
330 (holding that inherent in the constitutional plan is the notion that a state is immune
from suit without its consent); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at 44-46; 1
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91-99 (1923)
(describing the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment).
The scope of the Eleventh Amendment evolved through expansions and limitations on the
literal reading of the text of the Amendment. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1,
§ 2.11, at 44-46. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Amendment, however, did not bar suits in federal court
brought by the United States or by another state against a state. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 1, § 2.11, at 46; see also Monaco, 292 U.S. at 328-29. The Amendment does not
reserve total immunity of the states to federal laws; however, by recognizing state immu-
nity to suit in federal courts, it necessitates that the suits be brought in state court. See
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at 44-46.
Modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence limits federal courts from exercising juris-
diction over particular suits against states. See id. The Court has recognized three circum-
stances under which the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state. See id. First, the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought against a state in federal courts. See id. The
Eleventh Amendment does not bar, however, suits brought in state courts. See id. at 46-50.
Second, the Amendment bars suits against any entity that constitutes a "state," meaning
the government or agencies of the state, but not its political subdivisions. See id. at 47-48;
see also infra notes 12-14 (discussing the limited exceptions to the general rule that the
Eleventh Amendment bars all suits against states for monetary damages).
3. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment embodied state
sovereign immunity). In subsequent Supreme Court cases, the Court reaffirmed that the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity existed in the language of the Eleventh Amendment.
See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144
(1993); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 229 n.2
(1989); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-74 (1987);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 97-
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constitutional provision governing the judiciary, by limiting the federal
courts' jurisdiction to hear suits brought against states.4 The Amendment
100; Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Employees v. Department of Pub-
lic Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128,
140 (1965); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co.
v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 n.13 (1952); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944); Missouri v.
Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921); Duhne v. New
Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 34 (1918); Smith v. Reeves,
178 U.S. 436, 446 (1900); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 30 (1890); see also NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 45 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to
overrule the Chisholm decision, in which the Supreme Court allowed a non-citizen to sue a
state for the payment of past debts and damages); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congres-
sional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1422-41 (1975) (describ-
ing the historical background of the Eleventh Amendment). But cf CLYDE E. JACOBS,
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 20-22 (1972) (arguing that
"whether [state sovereign immunity] was waived cannot ... be resolved in favor of implied
waiver" on the basis of anomalous English common law cases, and that Constitutional
Convention documents indicate that states were to lose sovereign immunity upon ratifica-
tion of the Constitution).
4. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330 (holding that the states "retain the same immunity
that they enjoy with respect to suits by individuals" against suits by foreign states); supra
note 3 (citing cases for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment represents the doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity). In Monaco, the Court held that despite the grant of
federal jurisdiction over suits "between a State ... and Foreign States", see U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1, the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against states by foreign states
unless the state consented. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330. The Monaco Court based its
holding on Alexander Hamilton's perception of state sovereign immunity as found in The
Federalist No. 81. See id.; THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton un-
derstood that states had not surrendered their sovereignty by ratifying the Constitution
and that they remained immune to suit. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330; THE FEDERALIST
No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979) (citing
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978), and holding that a state was not subject to suit
in federal court); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63 (finding that even though the Eleventh
Amendment by its terms did not bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the spirit of
the Eleventh Amendment barred all suits against states); Parden, 377 U.S. at 186 (recog-
nizing that unconsenting states were immune to federal court suits brought by citizens of
any state); Duhne, 251 U.S. at 313 (holding that the judicial power under the Constitution
did "not embrace the authority to entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own state
without its consent"); Smith, 178 U.S. at 446-48 (holding that a state could not be sued in
federal court except in limited cases, as conferred on the federal courts in the original
jurisdiction clause of the Constitution); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 524-25 (1899) (find-
ing that the Constitution did extend to the judicial power the authority to hear suits against
states brought by citizens of states). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 3-25, at 173-78 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the parameters of the Elev-
enth Amendment state sovereign immunity doctrine); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515
(1978) [hereinafter Field, Part One] (discussing the historical context of the Eleventh
Amendment); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203
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also implicitly limits Congress from adding to federal courts' jurisdiction
by creating a private right to sue state governments.5 The limit on the
(1978) [hereinafter Field, Congressional Imposition of Suit] (discussing the congressional
power to impose suits upon states in federal courts, despite the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983) (analyzing the extra-textual interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment in a historical context); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889
(1983) (discussing the historical setting of the Eleventh Amendment and arguing that the
Amendment was not to remove federal courts' jurisdiction in federal question cases);
David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98
HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984) (arguing for a clearer understanding of the Eleventh Amend-
ment's scope and purpose and for a return to Hans).
5. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996)(finding
that the Eleventh Amendment expressly limited the judicial power under Article III, and
that Congress could not use its Article I powers to circumvent the constitutional limitations
of the Eleventh Amendment by bestowing jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases
against a state); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(finding that states could not be sued without their consent notwithstanding Congress's
attempt to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause); see also Welch, 483 U.S. at 486 (regarding the principle of state sovereign immu-
nity as a stable constitutional doctrine); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 497 (finding that
the Eleventh Amendment prohibited federal court jurisdiction in suits against a states)
By interpreting Article III and the Eleventh Amendment together, the Court defined
the scope of federal court jurisdiction with regard to suits against a state. See Nowak,
supra note 3, at 1422-69. The Court also interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as an im-
plied limit on Congress's power to create causes of actions against state governments. See
id. at 1445-46. The limit did not restrict congressional power to the same extent that it
restricted judicial authority. See id. at 1460-64. The Court has taken two approaches in
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment's effect on congressional power: either to slightly
limit congressional power, see Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 (holding that Congress could
confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear suits against states when legislating pur-
suant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); or to severely limit con-
gressional authority, see Seminole, 116 S.'Ct. at 1131-32 (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment restricts Congress from authorizing suits by private individuals against states).
Initially, the Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar all suits brought against
states. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-12. In 1964, however, the Court loosened its construction
of the Eleventh Amendment by allowing Congress to authorize private individuals to sue
states pursuant to a state waiver of sovereign immunity. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 196-98
(holding that a state was subject to a federal damage action under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60). After Parden, the Court construed the Eleventh
Amendment to allow Congress to create causes of action against a state when Congress
showed express intent to waive state sovereign immunity. See Nowak, supra note 3, at
1446-50. Recently, the Supreme Court interpreted Hans to restrict congressional authority
to create causes of action against state governments. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32
(reaffirming the restrictive principle of state sovereign immunity, and holding that Article I
could not be used to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment); infra notes 148-88 and accom-
panying text (discussing the holding in Seminole). See generally Alan D. Cullison, Interpre-
tation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous.
L. REV. 1, 1-14 (1967) (discussing the history of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence);
Doyle Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207,
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judiciary, and intermittently on Congress, is subject to exceptions, such as
state consent to suit.6 Because the Eleventh Amendment affects both
state and federal powers, it also has become a method by which the Court
sustains the principle of federalism.
7
215-245 (1968) (discussing the evolution of judicial interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment since ratification); Wayne McCormack, Intergovernmental Immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment, 51 N.C. L. REV. 485, 500-16 (1973) (analyzing the problem of judicial inter-
pretation of the Eleventh Amendment); Rick Claybrook, Comment, Implied Waiver of a
State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974 DUKE L.J. 925, 928-58 (discussing the evolu-
tion of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence after Parden); Kennedy P. Richardson,
Comment, Monetary Remedies Against the State in Federal Question Cases, 68 Nw. U. L.
REV. 544, 545-52 (1973)(discussing the effect of Parden on the state sovereign immunity
doctrine).
6. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 n.9 (finding that a waiver of sovereign immunity in
state court did not also constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity in federal court); see also
Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 467-68 (finding that a state legislature could waive state immu-
nity to suit only by clear language in general law); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S.
151, 171 (1909) (finding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity only by either clear
and express language in a state statute or by overwhelming implication of waiver in the
text of a state statute); TRIBE, supra note 4, § 3-25, at 175 (discussing that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a suit against a state where the state has given its consent). The
Court has consistently held that sovereign immunity belongs to the states and that, there-
fore, immunity could be waived pursuant to a state's choice. See Clark v. Bernard, 108
U.S. 436, 447 (1883). A state could waive its immunity expressly by explicit authorization
in the state's constitution or in a state statute. See Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214
(11th Cir. 1986); cf Murray, 213 U.S. at 171 (finding a state could waive its sovereign
immunity by overwhelming implication of waiver in the text of a state statute).
7. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322-23. The Court historically has construed the Eleventh
Amendment issue as a question of federalism. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242; Pennhurst,
465 U.S. at 99; TRIBE, supra note 4, § 3-25, at 177-78. The debate over state sovereignty
originated in a judicial construction of Article III of the Constitution that grants the judici-
ary the power to hear cases against states. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322. The mere recog-
nition of federal jurisdiction over sovereign states spawned a federalism debate over
whether the judiciary could overpower state autonomy. See id. at 322-23. Ultimately, the
debate resulted in the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which limits Article III by
revoking the judiciary's jurisdiction in cases arising against states. See id.
In Monaco, the Court captured the essence of the federalism theory of the Eleventh
Amendment by analogizing the structure of the Constitution to "postulates" of power:
Manifestly, we cannot ... assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the
words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.
There is ... the postulate that States of the Union still possessing attributes of
sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent ....
Id. at 322 (footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court has consistently construed the Eleventh Amendment as a check on
the balance of power between state and federal governments. See id. at 322-23. In es-
sence, the federalism issue controlled the evolution of Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1127 (reasoning that sovereign immunity jurisprudence
had deviated sharply from the traditional federalism jurisprudence); see also Nowak, supra
note 3, at 1441-45 (arguing that the "pragmatic problems of federalism posed by the Elev-
enth Amendment should be resolved by Congress, not by the Judiciary").
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Although the text of Article III makes no reference to this restriction
on the judiciary to hear cases against states,8 the Framers of the Constitu-
tion contemplated the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.9 Initially,
the Court failed to recognize that the Constitution preserved state sover-
eign immunity, however, and in astonishment of the Court's opinion, the
states proposed and ratified the Eleventh Amendment expressly overrul-
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The clause provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority; ... to Controversies between two or more States;-
between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of dif-
ferent States, and between a state, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
9. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 14 (quoting James Madison's and John Marshall's debate
that recognized the existence of state sovereign immunity in the Constitution). The Fram-
ers of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall recog-
nized state sovereign immunity. See id. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton stated: "It
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to suit of an individual without
its consent." See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed. 1961).
At the Virginia Convention, James Madison and John Marshall argued that state sover-
eign immunity should be specifically recognized in the construction of the Constitution.
See Arguments of Delegates to the Convention of Virginia, in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533,
555-56 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co., 2d ed. 1901) (1787) [hereinafter ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION]. James Madison stated, "It is not within the power
of individuals to call any state into court." Id. at 533. Similarly, John Marshall recognized
that "an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be
sued by a state." Id. at 555-56.
Many Justices and legal scholars, however, have argued that the Court misconstrued the
writings of the Founders and the historical precedential value of the sovereign immunity
doctrine. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1146 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that federal
question jurisdiction was misunderstood by the Hans Court); infra note 60 (citing sources
that discuss a literal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as compared to an extra-
textual interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment). The Hans Court argued that the
Founders never intended to preserve state sovereign immunity in the nature and the struc-
ture of the Constitution. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1146 (reasoning that the Framers were
hostile to the wholesale inclusion of common law doctrine into the American legal system,
such as the doctrine of sovereign immunity). The Framers claimed that sovereign immu-
nity should be restricted to suits in diversity by a literal reading, not an extra-textual inter-
pretation of the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 1147, 1172-77; see also JACOBS, supra
note 3, at 21-22 (arguing that the history of Article III "suggests contradictory answers" to
whether the states were immune from suit before the passage of the Eleventh Amend-
ment); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
572-76 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) (noting the historical background of the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts set forth in Article III of the Constitution); No-
wak, supra note 3, at 1422-30 (discussing the legislative and historical background of the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment).
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ing the Court's interpretation of sovereign immunity.' ° The Supreme
Court construed the Amendment to embody a constitutional right to
sovereign immunity that arose from the structure of the Constitution it-
self and the spirit of the Eleventh Amendment.'1 Later, the Court
10. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. The Eleventh Amendment was passed in reaction to the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia. See id.; see also Fletcher, supra note 4,
at 1059-64 (discussing the effect of the holding in Chisholm upon the states and the ratifica-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment). In Chisholm, the Court declined to recognize state
sovereign immunity. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 428 (1793) (holding that Article III of the
Constitution extended jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear cases against states);
Mathis, supra note 1, at 19-20 (discussing the genesis of Chisholm). After Chisholm, states
feared being plagued with suits. See Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1063. Within days of the
decision, the Eleventh Amendment was proposed and it was ratified by twelve states in
February 1795. See id. at 1059. See generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12, at 142 n.3 (2d ed. 1992) (listing historical cites
that argue that the Amendment did not grant a constitutional right of sovereign immunity
to states, but merely recognized the continuation of the analogous common law doctrine).
There were several theories why the Eleventh Amendment passed so swiftly after
Chisholm. See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1437-39. One theory for the support of the
Amendment was that the drafters of the Amendment wanted "to reaffirm the interpreta-
tion of Article III that citizens could not sue states in federal court." Id. at 1437. Another
theory for support of the Eleventh Amendment found that the tendency of the American
constitutional practice was to give more power to the states in the federal balance. See id.
at 1438. A final theory for the support for the Amendment was that the states feared suits
by British creditors for repayment of Revolutionary War debts. See id. at 1437-38. This
theory argued that the states may have supported the Eleventh Amendment for political
reasons to avoid increased tensions and a possible war with England. See id. at 1438-39.
See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3524 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the history behind Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence);
Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment-Lower Court Interpretations and the
Supreme Court's Reactions, 61 GEO. L.J. 1473, 1475-82 (1973) (discussing the development
of the state sovereign immunity doctrine via the Eleventh Amendment).
11. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. In Hans the Court recognized that sovereign immunity
existed in the structure of the Constitution despite the limitation presented in the letter of
the Eleventh Amendment. See id.; see also infra notes 57-74 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the holding in Hans). The Court construed the Eleventh Amendment and the
structure of the Constitution to limit Article III and to bar all suits against states, unless the
state waived its constitutional immunity. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. In finding that the
Eleventh Amendment guaranteed state sovereign immunity, the Court relied on Alexan-
der Hamilton's statements made in THE FEDERALIST No. 81:
It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one state to
the citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute that state in the federal
courts for the amount of those securities. A suggestion which the following con-
siderations prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to suit of. an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every state in the union. Unless therefore, there is
a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
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recognized three limited exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment: con-
12 1sent, the Ex parte Young doctrine,13 and, the focus of this Note,
Based on Alexander Hamilton's interpretation of sovereign immunity and that of other
historical precedents, the Hans Court explained that an "extrajudicial" interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment, as an embodiment of state sovereign immunity, operates as a
limit on Article III of the Constitution. Hans, 134 U.S. at 20. The Court thus found that
individuals could not sue their own state or any state of the United States unless the state
waived its constitutional immunity. See id. at 19-20. In essence, the Eleventh Amendment
barred all federal jurisdiction-in law, equity, and admiralty-in cases brought against
states pursuant to state law, federal law, or the Constitution. See Amar, supra note 1, at
1473 (explaining that individuals could not sue a state in federal court unless the state's
sovereign immunity was waived or abrogated).
12. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1021 (11 th Cir. 1994), affd,
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). There are two forms of waiver or consent: express or constructive.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467-68 (1945); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213
U.S. 151, 171 (1909). A state may expressly waive its sovereign immunity to a class of suits
or for the purpose of a particular suit. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at
50-51. In addition, a state can expressly waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by stat-
ute by clearly permitting suits against the state in federal court. See Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304-08 (1990). The state can also constructively
waive its immunity, however, many courts are very reluctant to imply such waivers. See
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at 50-51. The courts' reluctance stems from the
recognition that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is a constitutional right. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). Under very limited circumstances, the Court
has implied a waiver when the state participates in an interstate compact. See Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 280-82 (1959). See generally TRIBE,
supra note 4, § 3-26 (describing the concept of constructive waiver).
13. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908) (creating an exception to the
general doctrine of state sovereign immunity by asserting that a suit against a state official,
regarding the constitutionality of his action in enforcing state law, is not considered a suit
against a state); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 281 (1986) (holding that an equal
protection claim against a state official is not barred); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 69
(1985) (recognizing that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's actions is
not a suit against a state); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102 (recognizing that pursuant to the Ex
parte Young doctrine the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against a state official);
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 666 (reaffirming the Ex parte Young doctrine). Under the Ex
parte Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits in federal court for
injunctive relief against state officials. See Green, 474 U.S. at 69; Pennhurst, 46 U.S. at 102.
The Ex parte Young doctrine creates the legal fiction that an injunctive action brought
against a state official, who acted outside of the scope of his duty, is not a suit against the
state, but a suit against the official, and thus not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-160; Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102. The rationale behind the
doctrine is that when the state official acted outside of the scope of his duty, he is no longer
an agent of the state and could therefore be sued in his individual capacity. See Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60; Papasan, 478 U.S. at 281; Green, 474 U.S. at 69; Pennhurst, 465
US. at 102; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 651; TRIBE, supra note 3, § 3-38, at 144-47.
This exception is a common method by which plaintiffs seek to avoid a state's sovereign
immunity defense. See Nell Jessup Newton, In the Supreme Court: State of Idaho Seeks a
Real Property Exception to the Ex parte Young Doctrine, West Legal News, Oct. 16, 1996,
available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 590118. For instance, in Seminole, the Court considered the
Ex parte Young doctrine but failed to allow Indian tribes to use the doctrine to sue state
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abrogation.14
Congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment occurs when
Congress enacts legislation that confers jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear cases against states, overriding state sovereign immunity.15 Initially,
the Supreme Court recognized that Congress could abrogate state sover-
eign immunity only when legislating pursuant to section five of the Four-
officials to enforce gambling agreements on Indian lands. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-
33; see also Newton, supra, at *1.
The Supreme Court will revisit the issue in the 1996-97 term when it addresses whether
an exception to the Ex parte Young doctrine exists to bar prospective relief actions against
states where the action concerns real property. See Brief for Petitioner at i, Idaho v. Coeur
D'Alene Tribe, 116 S.Ct. 1415 (1996) (No. 94-1474); see also Coeur D'Alene Tribe v.
Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred
quiet title actions against states and state agencies for injunctive and declaratory relief),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996); Matthew Berry, Case Note, A Treasure Not Worth
Salvaging, 106 YALE L.J. 241 (1996) (discussing the lower court decision in Coeur D'Alene
Tribe).
14. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 (1976). The Supreme Court recognized
that Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity to suit under the Enforcement
Clause. See id. The theory behind the abrogation doctrine is that when Congress "act[s] in
accordance with its article I powers as augmented by the necessary and proper clause, or
act[s] pursuant to the enforcement clauses of various constitutional amendments," it can
abrogate state sovereign immunity. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 3-26, at 185-86; see also Semi-
nole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment expanded congressional
power at the expense of state authority, thus expressly allowing Congress to abrogate state
authority when acting pursuant to the Enforcement Clause); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 451-52
(holding that Congress's plenary authority, when acting pursuant to the Enforcement
Clause, includes the authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment).
Under the plan of convention theory, the Court recognized that when the states signed
and ratified the Constitution, they ceded some of their immunity to Congress over the
areas in which Congress has plenary authority. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (developing the rationale known as the plan of convention theory).
Thus, according to this theory, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity when legis-
lating pursuant to ceded powers. See id. at 21. Applying this theory, the Court has held
that pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to create a cause
of action for money damages in fashioning solutions to environmental problems. See id.
See generally Field, Congressional Imposition of Suit, supra note 4 (discussing the doctrine
of congressional abrogation); Samuel H. Liberman, State Sovereign Immunity in Suits to
Enforce Federal Rights, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 195, 244-49 (analyzing the Fourteenth
Amendment in the context of congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment); No-
wak, supra note 3, at 1422-69 (discussing the history of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the relation between Congress and the Eleventh Amendment); Laurence H. Tribe, In-
tergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers
Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693-99 (1976) (discussing
the theory of Eleventh Amendment abrogation).
15. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123; Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20; Fitzpatrick, 427
U.S. at 456; George D. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the
Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REv. 343 (1985) (discussing the ability of Congress to displace the
Eleventh Amendment bar).
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teenth Amendment. 16 Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, also
known as the Enforcement Clause, empowers Congress to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against the states.17 Despite the recognition of
abrogation as a limitation on the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme
Court still struggled to balance federal interests with states' rights, in light
of state sovereign immunity.'
8
As a result of this struggle over federalism, the Court developed a two-
pronged test to guard against unwarranted abrogation of state sovereign
immunity. 19 The test prescribed a means for the Court to limit Congress
16. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) (finding that Congress may abro-
gate states' sovereign immunity pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (finding that
the Enforcement Clause is a "well-established" exception to Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 (recognizing that Congress may abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment when enacting legislation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause); Fitzpatrick,
427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)), for the proposition
that the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a restriction on
state power). Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provision of this article." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV, § 5. The Fitzpatrick Court found that Congress could abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment pursuant to legislation enacted under the Enforcement Clause. See Fitzpat-
rick, 427 U.S. at 455. The Court reasoned that because the Fourteenth Amendment was
directed at limiting states' actions, the Amendment restricted state power and expanded
Congress's Power. See id. at 455-56. Pursuant to the Enforcement Clause, Congress has
the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment through executive, legislative, or judicial means. See id. at 454 (quot-
ing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see Tribe, supra note 4, § 5-12, at 330-31 (providing
an overview of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment). Using the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Supreme Court validated Congress's power to promulgate recon-
structive civil rights legislation applicable to the states. See id. § 5-12, at 331 n.8 (listing the
cases upholding Congress's power to enforce, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment). The
issue regarding the extent of Congress's power arose in subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966). In Katzenbach, the Court found that the Enforcement Clause
authorized Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment on the states
through laws that are reasonably related to the provisions of the Amendment. See 384.
U.S. at 649.
18. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43 (hesitating, but eventually deciding to abrogate
state sovereign immunity because of the important role it played in the federal system);
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 (stating that its reluctance to abrogate sovereign immunity stems
from the states' role in the federalist system). The Court recognizes that states have a
special position in our constitutional system. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985). Furthermore, the Court's reluctance to permit congres-
sional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment is also grounded in the need to maintain a
"balance of power between the States and the Federal Government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties." Id. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123. After Fitzpatrick, subsequent decisions led to the
development of a stringent test designed to guard against any unjustified abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43; see also supra note 18 (dis-
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from unjustly abrogating the Eleventh Amendment in instances when
Congress did not have the constitutional authority to abrogate. 20 How-
ever, the Court itself did not abstain from recognizing Congress's author-
ity to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to another
constitutional power other than the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 The
Court later recognized Congress's abrogation powers to include Con-
gress's plenary power over interstate commerce, in addition to the En-
forcement Clause.22 This acceptance of greater congressional power to
abrogate, however, hampered the Court's struggle to balance states'
rights with federal interests and heightened the search for an abrogation
doctrine that would allow a delicate balance.23
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida ,24 the Court embraced the tradi-
tional state sovereign immunity doctrine recognized over two centuries
earlier, redefining Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 25 The Seminole
Indian Tribe alleged that Florida officials failed to comply with the Indian
Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA),26 a federal statute allowing Indian
tribes to conduct prescribed gaming activities 27 pursuant to a valid agree-
cussing Atascadero and the Atascadero Court's reluctance to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity). The two-prong abrogation analysis requires a showing that, first, Congress
"'unequivocally"' intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and second, that Con-
gress legislated "'pursuant to a valid exercise of power."' Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123
(quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
20. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242. The two-pronged test was designed to prevent
Congress from legislating outside of its constitutional powers, thereby upsetting the bal-
ance between state sovereign and federal power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.
See id. Despite the Court's recognition of the two-pronged test, the Court still recognized
Congress's authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, a valid exercise of power which "with[held] power from the states at the same time
as it confer[red] it on Congress." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19.
21. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19 (finding that Congress had the authority to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause).
22. See id. at 19-23.
23. See id. at 35-42 (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
24. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
25. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. The Court granted certiorari to consider two
issues: 1) whether the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from creating a right of
action against states to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), enacted pur-
suant to the Indian Commerce Clause; and 2) whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young
authorized suits against a state's governor to enforce a good faith bargaining clause of the
IGRA. See id.
26. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). Congress enacted the IGRA under the Indian
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to promote economic development and self
sufficiency among tribal nations. See § 2701 (1); Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 2, 102 Stat. 2467 (as
codified in 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994)). The IGRA grants Indian tribes the right to regulate
gaming activities on their land so long as the gaming was not prohibited by federal law or
state law. See § 2701(5).
27. See § 2701(5). The IGRA specifies three classes of gaming. See § 2703. Class I
includes gaming solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional Indian games, § 2703(6);
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ment28 between the state and an Indian tribe.29 The IGRA, enacted pur-
suant to the Indian Commerce Clause,3° required that states negotiate an
agreement with Indian tribes in good faith. 31 The IGRA also created a
statutory right for tribes to sue a state in federal court if the state failed to
negotiate in good faith.32
After the State of Florida refused to negotiate a compact over gaming
class II includes games such as bingo, pull tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, and other card
game activities not prohibited by state laws, § 2703(7)(A); and Class III includes all gaming
that were not in Class I or Class II, § 2703(8).
28. See § 2710(d)(1)(C). The IGRA prescribes that a "Tribal-State compact" would
set forth the Indian tribe's authority to allow gaming activities on Indian lands that other-
wise violated state law. See § 2710(d)(3)(A). Furthermore, the IGRA stated that the com-
pact should be negotiated between states and an Indian tribe in good faith. See id. Once
the tribal-state compact is agreed upon, the Indian tribe can lawfully operate gaming activi-
ties on its tribal lands. See § 2710(d)(1)(C).
29. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C). The IGRA allows Indian tribes to conduct Class III gam-
ing activities through the enactment of a "Tribal-State compact." See id. The IGRA states
that "Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are
... conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe
and the state." § 2710(d)(1). The tribe can initiate negotiations of the tribal-state compact.
See § 2710(d)(3)(A). If the state did not act in good faith in negotiating the compact, the
IGRA gives the Indian tribe a right to sue the state in federal court. See § 2710(d)(7)(A).
30. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119.
31. See § 2710(d)(3)(A).
32. See § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). The statute states that
"[t]he United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over ... any cause of
action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a state to enter into
negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State
compact ... or to conduct negotiations in good faith."
Id. Under the IGRA, Congress expressly abrogated states' sovereign immunity to suit by
creating a right for Indian tribes to sue states in federal court. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at
1121.
Federal district courts were split on the issue of whether Congress could abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. Compare Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 661 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir.
1994), affd 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), with Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F.
Supp. 550, 558 (S.D. Ala. 1991)(finding no abrogation), affd sub nom. Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). In Seminole,
the district court held that Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause. See Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 660. In Poarch, the district court
found that even though Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to the IGRA, the Indian Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. See Poarch, 776 F. Supp. at 558. On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consolidated Seminole and Poarch to address whether
Congress successfully abrogated state sovereign immunity when enacting the IGRA. See
Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1018. The court of appeals held that abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause was unconstitutional. See id. at
1028. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Congress may abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. See Seminole, 115 S.
Ct. at 932.
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activities that were illegal under Florida law,33 the Seminole Indians sued
the State of Florida in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, alleging that all types of gaming activities prescribed
in the IGRA were negotiable in the tribal-state compact.34 The State of
Florida moved to dismiss the complaint, raising its sovereign immunity
defense,35 but the district court denied the motion, holding that the
IGRA constitutionally abrogated the Eleventh Amendment. 36  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's judgment and remanded the case, holding that the IGRA did
not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment because the Indian Commerce
Clause did not empower Congress to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity.37 The Supreme Court granted certiorari38 to resolve the issue of
whether the Indian Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to ab-
rogate the Eleventh Amendment.39 The Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment prevented Congress from abrogating state sovereign immu-
nity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.4" The Court reasoned
that the traditional doctrine of state sovereign immunity, as established in
33. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121. The Seminole Indian Tribe asked the State of
Florida to negotiate a tribal-state compact to allow the Seminole tribe to run gaming activ-
ity on its land. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996) (No. 94-12). On March 4, 1991, the Seminole Tribe submitted a contract pro-
posal to Florida for the operation of computer versions of "poker, bingo, pull-tabs, lotto,
punchboards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo." Id. at 7. The state
agreed to discuss poker but rejected all of the tribe's other requests because they were
illegal in Florida. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 849.15-849.16 (West 1994). On
September 19, 1991, the Seminole Tribe filed suit against Florida in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida claiming that the state violated the IGRA.
See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1020.
34. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121. In its complaint, the Seminole Tribe contended
that all types of Class III gaming activities should be negotiable under the IGRA because
the state permitted some Class III gaming activities within the state. See id. The Seminole
Tribe contended that the state violated the good faith provision of the IGRA by refusing to
enter into any negotiations over Class III gaming activity. See id.
35. See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1020.
36. See Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 657-58. The district court applied the two-prong
abrogation analysis and found that the IGRA abrogated state sovereign immunity on its
face. See id. at 658. It also held that Congress had the power, under the Indian Commerce
Clause, to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See id. The court found the Indian Com-
merce Clause was analogous to the Interstate Commerce Clause and that, therefore, Con-
gress possessed complete and plenary power under the Indian Commerce Clause to
abrogate sovereign immunity. See id. at 661. Upon the denial of the motion to dismiss, the
state completed an interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1021.
37. See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1025-28.
38. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
39. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
40. See id. at 1119. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas constituted the members of the majority. See id.
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Hans v. Louisiana,41 prohibited Congress from creating a federal forum
for individuals to sue states, unless Congress legislates pursuant to the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
In separate dissenting opinions, Justice Souter and Justice Stevens rea-
soned that the Eleventh Amendment did not limit Article I and that the
majority incorrectly relied on the extra-constitutional principle of sover-
eign immunity to limit Congress's authority to abrogate.43 In addition,
Justice Stevens argued that neither the Eleventh Amendment nor any
common law constitutional principle limited Congress from statutorily
creating a right of action against a state in federal courts.44 Further, Jus-
tice Souter argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not limit the fed-
eral courts from hearing suits against a state arising out of a federal
question. 5
This Note examines the interpretive evolution of the Eleventh Amend-
ment in light of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. This Note first
discusses the Supreme Court's initial recognition of the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity after the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.
Then, this Note traces the Court's expanding and changing interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment, including congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. This Note then discusses the Court's return to the
traditional interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, which restricted
congressional abrogation and upheld the doctrine of state sovereign im-
munity. Finally, this Note analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, and argues that the decision will
create both federalism and separation of powers problems, as well as con-
fusion in the lower courts.
41. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
42. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131; Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-14.
43. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 1145-85 (Souter J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer. See id. at 1145.
44. See id. at 1133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the majority
had unconstitutionally construed the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on Congress for the
first time in history. See id. He contended that the Eleventh Amendment applied only to
the judiciary and not to Congress. See id. at 1134-35; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15-20 (1984) (finding that Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment pursuant. to the Interstate Commerce Clause).
45. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1167 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Fletcher, supra
note 4, at 1045-78 (discussing federal question jurisdiction with regard to traditional Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence); Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1941-2002 (discussing the dif-
ferent interpretative theories regarding the judicial construction of the Eleventh
Amendment); Jackson, supra note 1, at 44-51 (discussing the diversity theory interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment).
[Vol. 46:10051018
1997] Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 1019
I. EVOLUTION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. The Historical Background of State Sovereign Immunity
For a period spanning almost two centuries,46 the development of state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence evolved from the Supreme Court's
non-recognition47 of the doctrine to full acceptance.48 Initially, the
Supreme Court declined to recognize state sovereign immunity by liter-
ally construing Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution to
grant the judiciary the power to hear cases arising against states.49 Subse-
quently, the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment, amending Article
III and denying the federal judiciary the jurisdiction to hear cases brought
against a state.5 °
In the seminal pre-Eleventh Amendment decision Chisholm v. Geor-
gia5 1 the Supreme Court refused to recognize the doctrine of state sover-
eign immunity, reasoning that Article III empowered federal courts to
hear cases against a state.52 In Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina
46. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1130; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 465
(1793). Over two hundred years passed between the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm, which rejected the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, and the Court's deci-
sion in Seminole, which reaffirmed the fundamental principle of state sovereign immunity.
Compare Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 465, with Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1130. Justice Ire-
dell's dissent in Chisholm greatly influenced the present development of the current doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. See JACOBS, supra note 3, at 64-65
(discussing the events following the Chisholm decision); Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler,
Suits Against States: Diversity of Opinion in the 1970's, 1993 J. Sup. Cr. HIST. 73, 86 (noting
the impact of the Eleventh Amendment on constitutional jurisprudence); Mathis, supra
note 1, at 20-23 (explaining the events leading up to the Chisholm decision); John V. Orth,
The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L. REV.
255, 256-60 (1994) (recognizing Justice Iredell's influence on the interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment).
47. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 451 (rejecting the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity by construing Article III of the U.S. Constitution as a grant of power to the
judicial branch to hear cases against a state).
48. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1890) (finding that the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity is embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the structure of the
Constitution); see also Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 (reaffirming that the fundamental prin-
ciple of state sovereign immunity is a limit on Article 1It).
49. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 450-51.
50. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at 45; see also Fletcher, supra note
4, at 1045-63 (analyzing the effect of Chisholm on early state sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence); Nowak, supra note 3, at 1433-41 (discussing the history of the ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment); supra notes 2, 10 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment and the decision in Chisholm).
51. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). In delivering its opinion, the Supreme Court, sitting in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, followed the practice of English judges by orally delivering
their opinions seriatim with the most senior justice speaking last. See Orth, supra note 44,
at 256.
52. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 423.
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sued the State of Georgia for monetary damages arising from Revolu-
tionary War debts.53 The State of Georgia raised the defense of sover-
eign immunity.54 Chisholm argued that the language of Article III
granted the judiciary the power to hear cases arising between a state and
a citizen of another state.55
The Chisholm Court interpreted Article III literally, barring any sover-
eign immunity defense.56 The Court reasoned that the language in the
Constitution was explicit and, therefore, granted the judiciary the author-
ity under Article III to hear such controversies. 57  In reaction to
Chisholm, the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment, amending Article
III and recognizing a state's immunity to suit.58
B. A Broad Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and the
Recognition of State Sovereign Immunity: Hans v. Louisiana
After rejecting the state sovereign immunity doctrine, the Supreme
Court reconsidered the doctrine and recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment uniformly protected states against suits brought by private
individuals in federal court.59 To avoid strict textual interpretation of the
53. See id. at 419.
54. See id. at 429-30. The State of Georgia argued that Article III permitted the judi-
cial branch to hear cases and controversies between a state and a citizen of another state
only when the state had waived its sovereign immunity. See id. at 430.
55. See id. at 419-20.
56. See id. at 450. In holding that the Constitution empowered the judiciary to hear
cases arising against a state, the Court interpreted two separate clauses of Article III, sec-
tion 2. See id. at 466. It discussed the following clauses in its opinion: "The judicial Power
shall extend to... controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State... [and]
[iun all cases ... in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. The Court construed these clauses to find that the
Constitution granted the judicial branch jurisdiction to hear suits brought by a citizen of
one state against another state. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 466.
57. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 466. The majority found that, although the
Constitution recognized states as sovereigns, the letter of the Constitution and the charac-
ter of the federal government diminished and limited state sovereignty. See id. at 456.
Furthermore, the majority argued that the Constitution clearly and directly indicated that
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear cases and controversies arising against states and,
therefore, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not limit Article III. See id.
58. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. Less than two years after the Supreme Court ren-
dered the decision in Chisholm, the states proposed and ratified the Eleventh Amendment.
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at 45; Nowak, supra note 3, at 1433-41. The
reaction to Chisholm was swift because states feared suits by Revolutionary War creditors.
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 2.11, at 45; 1 WARREN, supra note 2, at 96 (dis-
cussing the effect of the decision in Chisholm on the states); Marcus & Wexler, supra note
44, at 86 (discussing the reasons for the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment and the
reaction to the Chisholm decision); Nowak, supra note 3, at 1437-41; supra note 10 and
accompanying text (discussing theories for the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment).
59. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (confirm-
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Constitution, the Supreme Court broadly construed the Eleventh
Amendment beyond its textual meaning.6" The Supreme Court first rec-
ognized state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment 61 by ex-
tra-textually interpreting the letter of the Amendment to presuppose the
full protection of state sovereign immunity.62
In Hans v. Louisiana,6 3 the Court held that the spirit, not the letter, of
the Amendment preserved state sovereign immunity in all suits brought
by citizens against states.64 In Hans, the petitioner, a Louisiana citizen,
ing that Hans established that the Eleventh Amendment stands for state sovereign immu-
nity); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987) (finding
that Hans established state sovereign immunity jurisprudence in the federal system); Em-
ployees v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 290-94 (1973) (recognizing that
Hans established the doctrine of state sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh
Amendment).
60. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 448 (1900); Hans, 135 U.S. at 13-15; John V.
Orth, The Eleventh Amendment and the North Carolina State Debt, 59 N.C. L. REV. 747,
748-50 (1981) (explaining how passage of the Eleventh Amendment allowed Southern
states to repudiate their debts); John V. Orth, The Fair Fame and Name of Louisiana: The
Eleventh Amendment and The End of Reconstruction, TULANE LAW. Fall 1980, at 2, 11-13
(discussing the history of the Eleventh Amendment during the post-Reconstruction era);
cf. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 238-54 (1985) (addressing the practicality of a
literal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment); William A. Fletcher, Exchange on the
Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 131-32 (1990) (discussing the theory that the
Eleventh Amendment "was intended to repeal that part of the state-citizen diversity clause
of Article III that had conferred party-based jurisdiction over unconsented suits brought
against states by out-of-state citizens or aliens," also known as the "diversity theory");
William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to
Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1261-64 (1989) (defending the diversity theory interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment); Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1893-94 (addressing whether
the Eleventh Amendment barred cases arising out of a federal question); Vicki C. Jackson,
The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J.
1, 44-51 (1988) (analyzing an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment based on the
diversity theory).
61. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. Immediately after the states ratified the Eleventh
Amendment, the Hans Court broadly interpreted the Amendment to presuppose state
sovereign immunity in the structure of the Constitution and in the constitutionally man-
dated balance of federalism. See id. The decision in Hans was in direct reaction to the
extremely textual interpretation of Article III in Chisholm. See id. at 11 (describing the
Chisholm decision as "startling" and "unexpected"); see also Richard Monette, When
Tribes Sue States: How "Federal Indian Law" Offers an Opportunity to Clarify Sovereign
Immunity Jurisprudence, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 401, 413-16 (1994) (surveying the doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity in the context of the federal system).
62. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-13. In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment as embody-
ing the fundamental principle of state sovereign immunity, the Hans Court relied on the
historical doctrine of sovereign immunity and the opinions of the Founders. See id. at 12-
16. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that sovereign
immunity to suit is an essential element of state sovereignty).
63. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
64. See id. at 13-14. The petitioner also filed suit against the State of Georgia for
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brought a suit against his state to collect unpaid Civil War contracts, argu-
ing that an amendment to the State of Louisiana's Constitution forgiving
the repayment of such contract violated Article I, Section 10 of the
United States Constitution.65 The State of Louisiana raised a sovereign
immunity defense. 66 The petitioner asserted that the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not bar his suit because the Amendment only prohibited suits
brought by citizens of another state.
67
The Hans Court examined whether a state was subject to suit in federal
court by one of its own citizens when the suit arose under the laws of the
United States.68 The Court first addressed whether a citizen of a state
could sue his own state based solely on federal question jurisdiction.
69
The Court found that the case arose under a federal question because the
amendment to the State of Louisiana's Constitution interfered with Arti-
cle I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting states from im-
pairing the validity of contracts. 70 The Court found, however, that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibited granting federal jurisdiction merely on
the grounds that the suit involved a federal question.71
The Court then addressed whether the Eleventh Amendment acted as
a bar to suits brought against a state by one of its own citizens.72 Despite
the omission of this language from the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
held that the Amendment acted as a jurisdictional bar, by implication, to
breach of contract. See Hans v. Louisiana, 24 F. 55, 55-56 (C.C.E.D. La. 1879), affd, 134
U.S. 1 (1890). The court of appeals dismissed the case, finding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment barred federal court jurisdiction. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 3-4. The Petitioner appealed
the circuit court's order and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See id. at 4. The
Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity barred suits in
federal question as well as in diversity despite the literal reading of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. See id. at 13-16. The Court reasoned that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
was inherent in the structure of the Constitution and, therefore, the Court could apply the
doctrine by implication. See id.
65. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
66. See id. The State of Louisiana argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to
hear the suit without the state's consent because the Eleventh Amendment granted the
state sovereign immunity. See id.
67. See id. at 1-3.
68. See id. at 9.
69. See id.
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Hans, 134 U.S. at 4.
71. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 9-10. The Court criticized the petitioner's argument that the
federal court had jurisdiction to hear the case because it arose under the Constitution or
the laws of the United States. See id. at 10. The Court found that the Eleventh Amend-
ment was enacted to protect a state's sovereign immunity regardless of whether cases
against it arose under diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. See id. The
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment stood not for the literal reading of the language
in the Amendment, but for the sovereign immunity of states. See id.
72. See id. at 10.
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such suits.73 The Court also found that the recent ratification of the Elev-
enth Amendment, in reaction to the Chisholm decision, proved that the
states intended to bar all suits against states.74 The Court also reasoned
that the Framers intended to preserve the doctrine of state sovereign im-
munity in the Constitution and never intended for the letter of the Con-
stitution to be read to subject states to suit in federal court.75 Hans
established that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity was embodied
in the spirit of the Eleventh Amendment and reflected in the structure of
the Constitution and the federal system.
76
C. Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment
Although Hans's extra-textual analysis of the Eleventh Amendment
73. See id. at 13. The Hans Court found that states understood that, at the time of the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, state sovereign immunity was guaranteed by the
Constitution. See id. at 16-17. The Court interpreted the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in light of the intent of the drafters and ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 13-
14; see also Merrit R. Blakeslee, Case Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and States'
Sovereign Immunity From Suit by a Private Citizen: Hans v. Louisiana and Its Progeny
After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, 24 GA. L. REV. 113, 115-117 (1989) (discussing
the Hans Court's expansion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
74. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-12. In rejecting a literal interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court reasoned that it would be absurd to interpret the Amendment to
bar suits based on diversity of jurisdiction but to allow suits based on federal question
jurisdiction. See id. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the states intended for the
Eleventh Amendment to bar both suits in diversity and federal question because they
swiftly enacted the Amendment in reaction to the unpopular Chisholm decision. See id.;
cf. Marshall, supra note 1, at 1365 (providing alternative explanations for the passage of
the Eleventh Amendment); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 62 (criticizing the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity and arguing that other doctrines, such as comity, would better serve federal-
ism concerns).
75. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-16. In concluding that state sovereign immunity was pre-
supposed in the Constitution, the Court discussed the Founders' prior writings and sifted
through the historical meaning of sovereign immunity. See id. See generally THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the construction of Article III of the Con-
stitution setting forth the jurisdiction of the federal courts). At the Virginia Convention,
both James Madison and John Marshall argued that the literal construction of Article III
should not enable citizens to recover claims against states. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13-14.
They claimed that it was in the nature of sovereignty to be immune from suit in federal
court. See ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 533, 555. Thus, it
was reasonable to conclude that the Framers intended that sovereign immunity be pre-
served. See Hans 134 U.S. at 13-14.
76. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987)
(recognizing that since Hans, the Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment barred
citizens from bringing suits against their own state in federal court); Employees v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 290-94 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(explaining that, although the Eleventh Amendment does not refer to a citizen's attempt to
sue his own state in federal court, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear such a suit due
to the Court's interpretation of the "spirit" of the Amendment).
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endured,77 subsequent Supreme Court decisions reinterpreting the
Amendment narrowed its scope by allowing congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity and judicial review of suits against a state.78
The Supreme Court recognized that certain constitutional provisions em-
powered Congress to override the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh
Amendment.79 The abrogation debate, however, spawned a struggle in
the Court over the balance between states' rights and Congress's author-
ity to enlarge its power at the states' expense.8"
1. Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment.: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
The Supreme Court subsequently recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment was not an absolute bar to suits brought against states, and
found that Congress could abrogate81 the Eleventh Amendment to en-
77. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 & n.7 (1996) (citing
cases following Hans); supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that the
Eleventh Amendment embodied the fundamental principle of state sovereign immunity).
78. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 22 (1989) (finding that Con-
gress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment by enacting environmental legislation such
as Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) that created a private cause of action against states to recover clean-up costs);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-238 (1985) (finding that Congress
may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when enforcing the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976) (finding that state sovereign
immunity could be abrogated by Congress when legislating pursuant to the Enforcement
Clause).
79. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-29 (1989) (reaffirming the holding in
Fitzpatrick); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (reaffirming that the Eleventh Amendment is
subject to the exception of congressional abrogation); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)(recognizing that Congress may abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment when enacting legislation enacted pursuant to the Enforcement Clause); Fitz-
patrick, 427 U.S. at 453 (recognizing the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as an exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar); cf Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
343 (1979) (recognizing congressional abrogation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause and
also requiring a "clear [] showing of congressional purpose" to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment).
80. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43. The Atascadero Court discussed, at great
length, the importance of the balance between state and federal governments. See id. The
Court found that congressional abrogation upset the federal-state balance and, therefore,
threatened the existence of sovereign immunity. See id. The Court concluded that because
the Eleventh Amendment was so important to the federal system, the creation of a strict
test was required to ensure that Congress would not eviscerate the Eleventh Amendment.
See id.; see also Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (finding that congressional intent to abrogate
must be clearly expressed because abrogation jeopardized the Eleventh Amendment and
the federal principles that it reflected); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43 (explaining that
congressional intent to limit the power of states must be clearly expressed to preserve the
state sovereign immunity doctrine).
81. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453. Congressional abrogation is simply one of the
three judicially recognized methods to escape the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh
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force the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.82 The Court found
that certain congressional plenary powers implicitly bestowed authority
upon Congress to avoid the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.83 The Supreme Court construed the Constitution to allow Con-
gress to override the Eleventh Amendment, thus limiting the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity for the first time in the history of the Supreme
Court.'
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,85 the Court held that the Enforcement Clause
empowered Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, thus, recog-
nizing a limited exception to the Eleventh Amendment.86 In Fitzpatrick,
male state employees sued the State of Connecticut for sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act.87 The State of Connecti-
cut argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits brought against a
state by its citizens.88 The petitioners argued that Congress could abro-
Amendment. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7 (describing the abrogation exception to the
Eleventh Amendment). The two other exceptions to the state sovereign immunity defense
are consent and the Ex parte Young doctrine. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238; Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); see also supra notes 12-13 (discussing the Ex parte
Young and consent exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment). A state could not raise an
immunity defense if it had expressly or impliedly consented to a suit. See Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 238. Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an
individual from suing state officers in federal court for federal law violations. See Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60; Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 69 (1985). See generally Jeffrey
B. Mallory, Note, Congress' Authority to Abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity
From Suit: Will Seminole Tribe v. Florida be Seminal?, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 791, 799-804
(1995) (discussing the concept of states' waiver of sovereign immunity).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 (stating
that the Fourteenth Amendment "clearly contemplates limitations on [the states']
authority").
83. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 (noting that the Enforcement Clause "clearly con-
templates" abrogation); Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125 (reaffirming that abrogation pursuant
to the Enforcement Clause is constitutional); TRIBE, supra note 4, § 3-26, at 178-89 (dis-
cussing the interpretive evolution of the Court's construction of congressional abrogation).
84. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 17 (finding that the language of the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not give any hint of limiting congressional authority but that the Fourteenth
Amendment altered the "constitutional balance"); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (finding that
Congress abrogated the Eleventh Amendment for the first time by passing the Fourteenth
Amendment). See generally Siegel, supra note 50, at 546-47 (explaining that Congress
"usually" lacked the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment but that the Enforce-
ment Clause created the first exception to this rule).
85. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
86. See id. at 454.
87. See Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1994) (prohibiting employers
from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447-49.
The state employees alleged that the State of Connecticut's employee retirement plan dis-
criminated on the basis of sex. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447-49.
88. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49.
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gate state sovereign immunity because Congress possessed the constitu-
tional power to override the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to the
Enforcement Clause.
89
After reviewing the language of the Enforcement Clause,9" a plurality
of the Court found that the Enforcement Clause authorized Congress to
override states' authority, including their sovereign immunity.91 Because
the Court traditionally construed the Fourteenth Amendment as a direct
limitation on the states' powers and an enlargement of Congress's pow-
ers, it determined that Congress was empowered to restrict states rights.92
Thus, the Court concluded that the special character of the Enforcement
Clause granted Congress the authority to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment. 93
89. See id. at 451. Previously, the district court had ruled in favor of the petitioners,
finding that the retirement plan discriminated on the basis of sex. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
390 F. Supp. 278, 280 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 519 F.2d 559 (2nd Cir.
1975), affd in part and rev'd in part, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The district court, however,
granted the petitioners an award of injunctive relief against the state instead of monetary
damages, reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment barred the recovery of monetary dam-
ages in a suit against a state. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding that although the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not bar attorney's fee damages, the Amendment did bar damages for the loss of
retirement benefits. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 561 (2d. Cir. 1975), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court to
resolve the issue of whether Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment and allow
monetary damage actions when legislating pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Fitzpatrick 427 U.S. at 445 (citing the language of the Enforcement Clause).
90. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment autho-
rizes Congress to enforce the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to restrict unconstitutional state action. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 5;
see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966) (providing an example of congres-
sional preemption of state law pursuant to the Enforcement Clause). The Court tradition-
ally construed the Fourteenth Amendment as a direct limit on state action. See id. See
generally TRIBE, supra note 4, § 5-15, at 273 (discussing Congress's plenary power granted
by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
91. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455-56.
92. See id. at 453. In determining the extent of Congress's power pursuant to the
Enforcement Clause, the Fitzpatrick Court also looked to Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1880), in which the Court validated congressional power to enact legislation under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and
they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is
empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action . . . whether that action
be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State
sovereignty .... [I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations
which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power .... Indeed, every addi-
tion of power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of
the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.
Id. at 346.
93. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448. Because congressional power is plenary when
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2. Developing the Doctrine of Congressional Abrogation into a Two
Pronged Test: Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon
After the initial recognition of the abrogation doctrine,94 the Court
struggled with the possibility that abrogation could eviscerate meaningful
sovereign immunity protection.95 In reaction to this threat, the Supreme
Court developed a test providing for stringent judicial review of congres-
sional abrogation.96 In constructing the test, the Court required that
Congress plainly show its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment.97
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon98 marked a return to the tradi-
tional Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence established in Hans, while
still supporting the abrogation exception established in Fitzpatrick.99 In
acting pursuant to the Enforcement Clause, the Court found that the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not limit legislative action that granted jurisdiction to federal courts for suits
against states. See id. The Court recognized that when acting pursuant to the Enforce-
ment Clause, Congress could employ any method of enforcement, including a statutorily
created right to sue a state without invading a state's sovereignty. See id.
In addition, Fitzpatrick signaled the Court's willingness to recognize congressional abro-
gation pursuant to other constitutionally granted powers. See id. at 457. In separate con-
curring opinions, Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens recognized congressional authority
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Com-
merce Clause in Section 8, Article I of the Constitution. See id. at 457-58 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 458-60 (Stevens, J., concurring). The expansion of such powers
threatened the existence of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. See Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 242 (finding that congressional abrogation threatened state sovereign immunity and
the federal system).
94. See supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of the abrogation doctrine).
95. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43.
96. See id. at 242. In a series of cases involving both abrogation and waiver of state
sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court developed a test to restrict unwarranted congres-
sional abrogation or waiver of a state's sovereign immunity. See id. The Court created
obstacles to Congress's efforts to interfere with states' sovereignty. See id. The test fo-
cused on determining Congress's intent to abrogate in the letter of the statute itself. See id.
In a case involving state waiver of sovereign immunity, Employees v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), the Court first required that a congressional statute
show a clear intention to waive state sovereign immunity. See id. at 285 (finding that Con-
gress had no clear intent to waive sovereign immunity under an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standard Act because the language of the statute did not clearly express this intent).
In another case involving waiver of sovereign immunity, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), the Court required express language or an overwhelming intention to waive sover-
eign immunity in the statute. See id. at 673. In an abrogation case, Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the Court adopted the state waiver tests by requir-
ing an unequivocal expression of intent to abrogate in the text of the statute. See id. at 99.
Finally, in Atascadero, the Court solidified the test by requiring express language in the
statute itself expressing intent to abrogate. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
97. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
98. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
99. See id. at 238 (citing Hans and Fitzpatrick); cf. id. at 254-55 (Brennan, J., dissent-
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Atascadero, the Supreme Court restricted the abrogation doctrine to en-
sure that state sovereign immunity was not unjustly abrogated10 ° by es-
tablishing a test to determine the genuine intent of Congress. 10 1 The case
arose when the petitioner sued a state hospital pursuant to the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 (Act),102 claiming that the state violated the Act when
it denied him employment. 10 3 The State of California raised an Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity defense. 10 4 The petitioner responded
by arguing that the Act afforded individuals a statutorily created right to
sue a state in federal court.
1 0 5
The Court addressed whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibited in-
ing) (arguing that the Court's decision to create the clear statement rule obstructed Con-
gress's Article I powers).
100. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (finding that congressional legislation had to show a clear
legislative statement of intent to abrogate); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 28
(1989) (finding that Congress had to indicate on the face of the statute that it intended to
abrogate).
The clear statement test was commonly required in all areas that are associated with the
surrendering of constitutional rights. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242. The "clear state-
ment" requirement, established in Atascadero, was analogous to the test that courts ap-
plied when a state waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to a state statute or a
constitutional provision. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673. The stringent state waiver test
mandated that the waiver show clear intent expressly stated in the statutory language. See
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241. The abrogation test and the state waiver test were very similar
because they both dealt with the waiver of the state's constitutional right to be immune
from suit. See id. at 238 n.1.
101. See Atascadero 473 U.S. at 242. In three cases decided prior to Atascadero, the
Supreme Court sketched out the congressional intent requirement. See supra note 95 (cit-
ing cases developing the clear statement test). The Atascadero Court created a clearer and
more stringent test requiring congressional intent on the face of the statute. See Atas-
cadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (requiring "unmistakably clear" intent); accord Pennhurst, 465 U.S.
at 99 (requiring an "unequivocal expression of congressional intent"); Edelman, 415 U.S.
at 673 (requiring either "express language" or an "overwhelming" implication to abrogate
in the statute); Employees, 411 U.S. at 285 (requiring that the statute show a clear intention
to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
102. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). The Rehabilitation Act provided that no hand-
icapped person should be subject to discrimination under any program receiving federal
assistance. See id. A subsequent amendment to the Act set forth a statutorily created right
to sue the state for monetary damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Rehabilita-
tion Comprehension Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-602, tit. IV, 92 stat. 2955, 2982-83 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794a
(1994)).
103. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 242. The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss based on the
Eleventh Amendment bar. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272
(9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984). On remand, the court of
appeals reversed the district court, finding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar fed-
eral court jurisdiction because the state had consented to suit under the Act when it re-
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dividuals who were seeking monetary relief from suing states in federal
courts pursuant to the Act.10 6 The majority held that the abrogation doc-
trine, as recognized in Fitzpatrick, threatened not only the unwarranted
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment, 0 7 but also federalism's delicate
balance. 0 8 The Court then prescribed a test that permitted congressional
abrogation only if the statute showed clear and "unmistakable language"
demonstrating Congress's intent to abrogate state sovereignty.109 The
majority found that a stringent test would prevent legislation from over-
riding state sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh
Amendment."0
3. Expansion of the Congressional Abrogation Power Pursuant to
Article I: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
In subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the abrogation analysis devel-
oped into a two-prong test to determine if a statute abrogated state sover-
eign immunity.'1 ' Building upon the abrogation doctrine, the test
ceived federal funds. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
106. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240.
107. See id. at 242-43 (finding that abrogation threatened the doctrine of state sover-
eign immunity).
108. See id. at 243 (finding that abrogation could upset the balance of the federal sys-
tem); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (finding that the
vital role of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in our federal system explains why
the Supreme Court requires stringent tests to determine congressional intent).
109. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243.
110. See id.; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996)
(reasoning that the clear statement test was constructed to preserve the Eleventh Amend-
ment and its federal principles). Despite the stringent abrogation test, the Atascadero deci-
sion foreshadowed a threat to the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. See Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the doctrine of state sovereign immunity and
the clear statement of intent rule set forth by the majority. See id. First, he contended that
the current interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment was based on a mistaken historical
premise that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits in diversity and federal question cases.
See id. at 248. See generally David E. Egndahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1972) (discussing the current practicality of
sovereign immunity); Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1941-2002 (analyzing the diversity theory
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment). Justice Brennan argued that the Eleventh
Amendment barred suits only in diversity jurisdiction, but not federal question jurisdiction.
See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 252-53. He claimed, therefore, that Congress was not subject
to a stringent clear statement rule when creating a statutory right to sue states, but instead
was subject to the rational basis standard of review. See id. at 255-56. Justice Brennan also
asserted that Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to another valid
exercise of power other than the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 252-53. He found that
the clear statement test would not foreclose abrogation pursuant to other congressional
powers. See id. at 253.
111. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123 (expressing the test as two inquiries: "first,
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required first that Congress legislate pursuant to a valid exercise of
power, 112 and second that Congress express its intent to abrogate in the
statute itself.1 13 Despite the development of this stringent test, the possi-
bility that the Court could validate congressional actions, which could ex-
pand Congress's authority to abrogate, still threatened the Eleventh
Amendment.'
14
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 115 marked a decisive break1 16 from the
traditional judicial construction of the Eleventh Amendment by recogniz-
ing abrogation pursuant to Congress's plenary power over interstate com-
merce." 7 After being sued by the United States for environmental clean-
up costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
whether Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent' ... and second, whether Con-
gress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power" (citation omitted) (alteration in
original)); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991) (highlighting
the clear statement prong of the abrogation test).
112. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454 (1976). The two pronged test was
formed as a result of the combination of the holdings in Fitzpatrick and Atascadero. See
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122; Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
113. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243; see also supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the abrogation test established in Atascadero).
114. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989); cf. Seminole, 116 S. Ct.
at 1130.
115. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
116. See id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing the major-
ity's decision departs from precedent). In Union Gas, the Court expanded Congress's
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, see id. at 20 (Brennan, J.), as foreshadowed in
the dissenting opinions of Fitzpatrick and Atascadero. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 253
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454-55.
117. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 20 ("It would be difficult to overstate the breadth and
depth of the commerce power."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The reasoning in Union
Gas, extending congressional abrogation to the Interstate Commerce Clause, was com-
monly referred to as the "plan of convention" theory. See Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (noting that a state may consent to suit in federal court
"either expressly or in the 'plan of convention"'). The plan of convention theory dictated
that upon ratification of the Constitution, each state ceded powers to the federal govern-
ment. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 20. According to the theory, the states thus ceded their
sovereign immunity under the Constitution to the federal government in areas over which
the federal government had total control. See id.; see also Victoria L. Calkins, Note, State
Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.: The Demise of the Eleventh
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 456-459 (1991) (discussing the "evisceration"
of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity by the decision in Union Gas); James
Sherman, Comment, Altered States: The Article I Commerce Power and the Eleventh
Amendment in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1413-15 (1991) (dis-
cussing how Union Gas impliedly overruled the traditional construction of the Eleventh
Amendment); Susan Hill, Note, Are States Free to Pirate Copyrighted Materials and In-
fringe on Patents?-Pennsylvania v. Union Gas May Mean That They Are Not, 92 W. VA.
L. REV. 487, 502-08 (1992) (discussing Union Gas and the rationale of the plan of conven-
tion theory).
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tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)," 8 the respondent filed a third
party action against the State of Pennsylvania in federal court.11 9 The
respondent argued that because the State of Pennsylvania placed an ease-
ment on the respondent's land ten years prior to the suit, the state was
partly liable for the clean-up costs.12 ° The State of Pennsylvania argued
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit because Congress uncon-
stitutionally abrogated state sovereign immunity in CERCLA by legislat-
ing pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.12
The majority applied the Atascadero two-pronged test to determine
whether Congress had intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity
when it enacted CERCLA.'2 2  The Supreme Court first addressed
whether CERCLA clearly showed legislative intent to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity.' 23 The Court found that CERCLA permitted a suit
against a state in federal court, reasoning that Congress included statu-
tory language adequate to clearly express its intent to abrogate state sov-
ereignty. 124 The Court then addressed whether Congress had the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.2 5 The plurality of the Court found that Congress had plenary
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, 2 6 similar to its Fourteenth
Amendment power, and therefore, Congress could override a state's im-
118. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1994). The United States sued the petitioner, the operator of
a coal gasification plant, after a large coal tar deposit seeped into a creek near the peti-
tioner's dismantled plant. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5-6.
119. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6.
120. See id.
121. See id. The district court dismissed the respondent's complaint on the grounds
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal court from hearing the case. See id. The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision and found that there was no clear
expression of intent in CERCLA to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity. See id.
Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the opinion and remanded the case to deter-
mine whether a recent amendment to CERCLA expressed such required intent. See id.
On remand, the court of appeals held that CERCLA was constitutional because the
amendments clearly showed intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See id. Thus,
Congress was legislating pursuant to a valid grant of power. See id.
122. See id. at 13, 19.
123. See id. at 7-13.
124. See id. at 13.
125. See id. at 13-23.
126. See id. at 16 (reasoning that the Commerce Clause, like the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, "with one hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power away
from the States"); cf. id. at 36, 42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (reason-
ing that the majority's decision would upset the balance between federal authority and
states' rights); Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126 (stating that the plurality opinion in Union Gas
should be read narrowly, due to the implications of a broad reading for the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity).
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munity to suit.127
To support its conclusion, the plurality adopted the plan of convention
theory.128  According to the theory, abrogation was constitutional be-
cause the states surrendered part of their sovereign immunity in areas
such as interstate commerce when they ceded power to the federal gov-
ernment under the Constitution.2 9 By holding that the states impliedly
consented to abrogation, the Court did not overrule the decision in Hans
but rather avoided the constitutional question of whether the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited the judiciary from hearing controversies arising
against a state. 3 °
D. The Eleventh Amendment and Indian Tribes' Suits Against States in
Federal Court: Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak
The federal judiciary found the Eleventh Amendment was an absolute
bar to suits brought by Indian tribes against states over state regulation of
Indian gaming.' 31 The Court found that pursuant to the Eleventh
127. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 16. Prior to Union Gas, the Court had recognized that
Congress could abrogate states' immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause
only when a state expressly had waived its immunity. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of High-
ways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985). Union Gas, however, construed the Interstate Com-
merce Clause as a valid power under which Congress could abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity without the state's consent. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19.
128. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20.
129. See id. (finding that a state was not subject to suit in federal court unless it ex-
pressly waived its Eleventh Amendment privilege or else impliedly consented under the
plan of convention theory by ratifying the Constitution); see also Blakeslee, supra note 73,
at 129-35 (discussing the impact of the decision in Union Gas on Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence).
130. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23. In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court's analysis of the
Eleventh Amendment focused on the ways in which the Amendment limited Article Il1.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1890); Calkins, supra note 117, at 439-42 (discussing
the effect of Union Gas on traditional state sovereign immunity jurisprudence as estab-
lished in Hans). On the other hand, in both Fitzpatrick and Union Gas, the Court did not
discuss the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on Article III but instead broke from tradi-
tional state sovereign immunity analysis and focused on Congress's plenary powers as a
limit on state power. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the plurality's opinion in
Union Gas was flawed because its reasoning was inconsistent with traditional state sover-
eign immunity jurisprudence as established in Hans. See id. at 31. In Seminole, the
Supreme Court treated Eleventh Amendment limitations on Article I as the Court did in
Hans. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (recognizing an expansive Eleventh Amendment).
131. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Id. 1992), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996); see also
Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne R. Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian Gam-
ing? "A Few Pages of History Are Worth a Volume of Logic," 1996 BYU L. REv. 407, 439-
47 (discussing the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on Indian tribal sovereignty); Brian
M. Greene, Comment, The Reservation Gambling Fury: Modern Indian Uprising or Unfair
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Amendment, states were not only immune to suits brought by private
citizens, but also to suits brought by Indian tribes or other sovereign enti-
ties.132 Furthermore, the Court held that states did not constructively
waive their immunity to suit with respect to Indian tribes under the plan
Restraint on Tribal Sovereignty?, 10 BYU J. PuB. L. 93, 94-95 (1996) (discussing the rele-
vance of the Eleventh Amendment to Indian gaming); Newton, supra note 13, at "1-'5
(discussing the Eleventh Amendment issues presented by Coeur d'Alene).
With regard to Indian affairs, the Supreme Court previously held that state governments
may not regulate or prohibit gambling on Indian lands. See California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221 (1987) (denying state intervention based on the threat of
organized crime). The Supreme Court found that California could not criminally prose-
cute Indian tribes who were running commercial gambling facilities on Indian lands. See
id. at 216-17. In Cabazon, California threatened to apply criminal sanctions against the
Indians when the Indians opened gambling facilities on their lands. See id. at 207. The
tribes sought a declaratory judgment stating that California had no power to apply statu-
tory criminal penalties on Indian reservations. See id. at 206. California argued that it was
justified in not allowing Indians to gamble on Indian lands because California's laws
against gambling were criminal laws and that Congress had expressly granted California
broad criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands within the state. See id. at 207-08.
The majority found that California had permitted and promoted a substantial amount of
gambling in other settings. See id. at 208-10. The majority found that California regulated
gambling and did not prohibit it. See id. at 211-14. The majority, therefore, concluded that
the state had no authority to assert its jurisdiction over gaming activities on tribal lands.
See id. at 214. The holding in Cabazon comported with fifty years of federal case law that
held that state laws were not effective on Indian reservations. See McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) (concluding that the policy for leaving Indians
free from state regulation had been first articulated one hundred and forty one years
before the Court's decision); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (finding that states
did not have jurisdiction over Indian reservations). See generally Julian Schriebman, De-
velopments in Policy, Federal Indian Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 353, 354-58 (1996)
(discussing the effect of Seminole on the regulation of Indian gaming and states' rights).
In reaction to the decision in Cabazon, Congress enacted the IGRA to protect gaming
on Indian reservations. See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 106 Stat. 2472 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 2710 (1994)); see also 134 CONG. REC. 24,027 (1987). Congressional committees
discussed the importance of Cabazon and included it in their rationale for the passage of
the IGRA. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 2-6, 22-23 (1987) (noting that the Cabazon Court
balanced federal, state, and tribal interests to determine the proper degree of state author-
ity over gaming on Indian Lands and finding that Congress should employ a similar balanc-
ing test when legislating in this area); 134 CONG. REC. 24,027 (1987) (Statement of Senator
Evans) (arguing that the IGRA should be considered within the context of over a century
of developed case law, including the basic principles that the Supreme Court set forth in
the Cabazon decision). See generally T. Barton French, Jr., Note, The Indian Gaming Reg-
ulatory Act and the Eleventh Amendment: States Assert Sovereign Immunity Defense to
Slow the Growth of Indian Gaming, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 735, 738-40 (1993) (discussing the
history of the Indian gaming issue). Despite the Cabazon holding, the controversy over
Indian gaming on tribal lands remained heated. See Worthen & Farnsworth, supra, at 407-
08 (explaining that Indian tribes have profited financially from gaming activities on reser-
vations); Greene, supra, at 93-98 (discussing the differing concerns of Indian tribes and
states with respect to Indian gaming); Schriebman, supra, at 353 (noting that the expansion
of gaming on tribal Indian lands has been opposed by the states).
132. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 783-85 (1991).
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of convention theory.133 Unless Congress constitutionally abrogated the
Eleventh Amendment, the Amendment barred all suits brought against a
sovereign state, including those brought by Indian tribes.
134
Although not directly dealing with the conflict over Indian gaming,
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak135 marked a decisive victory for
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in the context
of Indian tribes' suits against states.136 The Blatchford Court held that
the principle of sovereign immunity barred suits brought not only by indi-
viduals and foreign states, but also by Indian tribes.' 37 In Blatchford,
Alaska Native Villages sued an Alaskan state official, seeking damages
for money owed under a state statute.' 3 The State of Alaska raised the
sovereign immunity defense.' 39 Alaska Native Villages, however, con-
tended that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to suits arising be-
tween two sovereigns 4 ° and that the states waived their immunity with
respect to Indian tribes when they signed the Constitution.'
4'
The Supreme Court addressed whether federal courts had jurisdiction
to hear a case brought by an Indian tribe against a state for monetary
damages. 142 The Court found that the notion of sovereign immunity, em-
133. See id. at 785-86.
134. See id. at 787-88.
135. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
136. See id. at 781 (recognizing that the states did not waive their immunity under the
plan of convention theory with respect to suits by Indian tribes). See generally Monette,
supra note 61, at 416-35 (surveying sovereign immunity in the federalist system in the con-
text of Indian tribes); Christopher L. Lafuse, Note, Beyond Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak: Permitting the Indian Tribes to Sue the States Without Regard to the Eleventh
Amendment Bar, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 639 (1992) (discussing the effect of the decision in
Blatchford on state sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
137. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779-80. The Court revisited the issue of the Eleventh
Amendment as a fundamental principle of state sovereign immunity in the context of suits
by Indian tribes against states. See id. at 779. In Blatchford, the Court returned to the
principle embodied in Hans and Monaco, finding that the doctrine of state sovereign im-
munity not only barred suits brought by individuals, but also those brought by other sover-
eigns, such as Indian tribes. See id. at 780; see also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
322-23 (1934) (finding that the principle of sovereign immunity extended to foreign sover-
eign countries suing states or state officials).
138. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 777-78 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 29.89.050 (Michie 1984)
(repealed 1985)).
139. See id. at 777-78.
140. See id at 779-81.
141. See id. at 780-82. The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that it vio-
lated the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 778. The court of appeals reversed the district
court's opinion and found that the state could not raise its Eleventh Amendment immunity
defense because it did not apply to suits by Indian tribes against states. See id.; see also
Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 872 F.2d 1384 (9th cir. 1989), withdrawn, 896 F.2d
1157 (1990), rev'd sub nom. Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
142. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 777.
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bodied in the Eleventh Amendment, extended to sovereign and foreign
states.143 The Court reasoned that the sovereign immunity defense was
inherent in the nature of sovereignty, and could not be waived, unless by
the consent of a state. 44 The majority then addressed whether the states
impliedly waived their sovereignty with regard to Indian tribes when they
adopted the Constitution, similar to the plan of convention theory. 45
The majority rejected this argument and found that states did not make
any concession of sovereign immunity with respect to Indian tribes when
adopting the Constitution because Indian tribes were not a party to the
Constitution. 146 The rejection of the plan of convention theory foreshad-
owed that congressional abrogation under the Indian Commerce Clause
may not have been constitutional in Eleventh Amendment Indian gaming
cases.1
47
II. SEMINOLE INDIANS OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AS THE SOVEREIGN PROTECTOR OF STATES'
RIGHTS
A. Tribal-State Compact Negotiations: The Framework for Seminole's
Abrogation Suit
In Seminole Indians of Florida v. Florida,4 8 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that the Eleventh Amendment protected state sovereign immu-
nity and restricted the doctrine of abrogation.149 In 1991, the Seminole
143. See id. at 777-82.
144. See id. at 780 n.1. The Court relied heavily on Monaco in finding that state sover-
eign immunity barred suits against Indian tribes in federal court. See id. In Monaco, the
sovereign nation of Monaco tried to sue the State of Mississippi in federal district court.
See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1934). The dispute concerned the State of
Mississippi's attempt to avoid liability for bonds that the state had bought prior to state-
hood. See id. The Court explained that the state enjoyed sovereign immunity to suits
brought by both foreign nations, as well as by citizens of another state. See id. The Mon-
aco Court found that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit because the
Eleventh Amendment represented the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity that
barred all suits against a state. See id. In discussing Monaco, the Blatchford Court con-
cluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred suits brought by individuals or sov-
ereign nations, including Indian nations. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 780-81.
145. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 781.
146. See id. at 782.
147. Cf. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126-28. (finding that states did not waive their sover-
eign immunity to suit pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause under the plan of conven-
tion theory)
148. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
149. See id. at 1127-29. See generally A Return to Conservative Activism, ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 1996, at 16C (editorial) (noting that the Seminole decision ex-
panded the doctrine of state sovereign immunity); Erwin Chemerinsky, Restricting Federal
Court Jurisdiction, TRIAL, July 1996, at 18 (discussing the judicial review and the future
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Indian tribe inquired about negotiations with the State of Florida regard-
ing gaming on its tribal reservation land pursuant to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).5 ° The IGRA s l allowed for the negoti-
ation of gaming contracts between Indian tribes and a state and author-
ized Indian tribes to sue the state in federal court if the state refused to
negotiate.1 52 The State of Florida refused to negotiate with the Seminole
implications of the Seminole decision); Lyle Denniston, Court Cuts U.S. Power Over States,
BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (arguing that the Seminole decision has far reaching
implications beyond Indian gambling rights); Frank J. Murray, High Court Revives States'
Rights Against Lawsuits, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (noting that the Seminole
decision is a landmark victory for states' rights advocates); Jim Myers, Tribal Gaming Now
Federal Issue, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 29,1996, at Al (discussing the implications of the Sem-
inole decision on Indian tribes); David G. Savage, High Court Curbs Federal Lawsuits
Against the States, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Savage, High Court
Curbs] (noting that the Seminole case is an influential federalism decision); Jay Weaver &
Bob French, Florida Raises the Ante Against Seminoles' Slots, SUN-SENTINEL (FLORIDA),
Mar. 29, 1996, at 1A (discussing the effect of the Seminole decision on Indian tribes' rights
to conduct gaming on Indian lands).
150. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 1994),
affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). The Seminole Indians wrote to the Governor of the State of
Florida requesting to negotiate a tribal-state compact, pursuant to the IGRA. See Brief for
Petitioner at 6-7, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct 1114 (1996) (No. 94-12).
Two months later, the Seminole tribe submitted a proposed compact, but the Governor's
counsel rejected the tribe's initial proposal with regard to most gaming activity except for
poker. See id. at 7.
151. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994 & Supp. 1995); see also Greene, supra note 131, at 98-
99 (summarizing the legislative history of the IGRA). The IGRA was enacted as a result of
increased litigation over Indian gaming. See Peter T. Glimco, Note, The IGRA and the
Eleventh Amendment: Indian Tribes are Gambling When They Try to Sue a State, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 206 (1993) (describing federal regulation of Indian gaming before
the IGRA). The IGRA was designed to address concerns of both Indian tribes and states.
See Greene, supra note 131, at 98-99. The IGRA provided a basis for Indian tribes to
operate gaming facilities in order to promote tribal economic development, self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments. See id. The IGRA also addressed states' concerns by as-
suring fair and honest gaming, setting federal standards for casino gambling, and prevent-
ing infiltration by organized crime. See id.
152. See Glimco, supra note 151, at 197. Congress has plenary power to regulate rela-
tions with Indian tribes under the Indian Commerce Clause in the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The IGRA attempted to regulate disputes over Indian gaming by
requiring the negotiation of a tribal-state compact between states and tribes to allow for
gaming on Indian lands. See § 2710(d)(1). Under IGRA, if the state refused to negotiate,
the Indian tribe could sue the state in federal court. See § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). As a result,
many Indian tribes brought suits against states to enforce their rights to have gaming facili-
ties on tribal lands. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123 n.8; Ponca Tribe of Ok. v. Oklahoma,
37 F.3d 1422, 1427-28 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410 (1996); Spokane Tribe of
Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 994-95 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410 (1996);
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280-81 (8th Cir. 1993); Maxam v.
Lower Sioux Indian Community of Minn., 829 F. Supp. 277,279 (D. Minn. 1993); Kickapoo
Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (D. Kan. 1993), affd sub nom. Ponca
Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410 (1996); Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp 655, 658 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th
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tribe over gaming activities prohibited by state laws. 153
Claiming that the state failed to negotiate a compact in good faith, the
Seminole Indian tribe filed suit against the State of Florida and its Gover-
nor in federal district court pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) &
(B)(i). 5 4 The State of Florida filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the suit.155 The district court denied the
state's motion and held that the IGRA constitutionally abrogated the
Eleventh Amendment. 56 In an interlocutory appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, reversed and remanded the
case, finding that the Indian Commerce Clause did not empower Con-
gress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 157 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to reexamine the circumstances under which Congress
may abrogate state sovereign immunity.
158
Cir. 1994), aft'd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); Saulte Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484,1486-89 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v.
Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 557-58 (1991).
153. See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1020.
154. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) & (B)(i). The provision states that the United States district
courts shall have jurisdiction over:
any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State
to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a
Tribal-State compact ... or to conduct such negotiations in good faith ....
An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action ... only after the close of the 180-
day period beginning on the date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to
enter into negotiations ....
Id.; Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121; see also Glimco, supra note 151, at 196-97 (discussing the
legislative history of the IGRA); Christopher J. Moore, Comment, What is Good for the
Goose is Good for the Gambler: How the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Fails to Abrogate
State Immunity and Protects Tribal Immunity, 21 Olo N.U. L. REV. 1203, 1204-09 (1995)
(discussing the mechanics of the IGRA).
155. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121.
156. See id. The district court applied the abrogation test to determine if Congress had
constitutionally abrogated the Eleventh Amendment in the IGRA. See Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 657-58 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir.
1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). The district court first found a clear expression of
intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the language of the statute because the
statute made numerous references to a "state" as a defendant in a suit. See id. at 658. The
court also found that Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power when legislating
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. See id. at 658-61. In finding that congressional
abrogation pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause was constitutional, the court rea-
soned that the Indian Commerce Clause was similar to the Interstate Commerce Clause
because they were both plenary powers of Congress. See id. The court concluded that the
IGRA constitutionally abrogated the Eleventh Amendment, pursuant to the Indian Com-
merce Clause. See id. at 161.
157. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121-22.
158. See id. at 1122.
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B. The Majority Opinion: Reaffirmation of the Two Hundred Year Old
Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity
In Seminole, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
protected state sovereign immunity, and that Congress could abrogate
sovereign immunity pursuant only to the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 59 In affirming the Eleventh Circuit's holding,
the Supreme Court found that neither the Interstate Commerce Clause
nor the Indian Commerce Clause empowered Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.160 The five member majority 161 rejected the theory
that Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to its
plenary powers by criticizing the plan of convention rationale set forth in
Union Gas.
162
1. Recognizing Traditional Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
The Seminole Court began its inquiry into congressional abrogation by
discussing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 63 The majority first rec-
ognized that the Eleventh Amendment represented an extra-constitu-
tional principle of state sovereign immunity.164  In explaining the
159. See id. at 1131. The majority overruled Union Gas and reconfirmed that the tradi-
tional principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment was
not subject to eradication by Congress's exclusive control over Indian commerce. See id.
160. See id. at 1128; see also Pat Smith, Point: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: A
Victory for States Rights; Indian Gaming Act Caught in the Crossfire, MONT. LAW., July-
Aug. 1996, at 21-22 (discussing the effect of Seminole on sovereign tribal nations).
161. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of
the Court, with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joining. See id. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 1133. Justice Souter also dissented, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. See id. at 1145.
162. See id. at 1123-28; see also David G. Savage, States on a Winning Streak, A.B.A. J.,
June 1996, at 46, 46-47 [hereinafter Savage, Winning Streak] (discussing the Eleventh
Amendment Seminole decision in the context of the balance between the sovereignty of
the states and the authority of Congress).
163. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. The Court looked to federal case law and found
that for over a century the Court had consistently held that the Eleventh Amendment
protected sovereign immunity and had restricted accordingly the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to hear cases and controversies between states. See id. at 1122 n.7 (citing additional
cases that stood for the proposition that state sovereign immunity was assumed in Article
III of the Constitution); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (reaffirming that the Eleventh Amendment should have been inter-
preted expansively when state sovereign immunity was at stake); Blatchford v. Native Vil-
lage of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (explaining that the Amendment stood "not so
much for what it said but for the presupposition of our constitutional system it con-
firm[ed]," and that the states retained their sovereign immunity when they "entered the
federal system"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (stating that state sovereign
immunity had been "clearly established").
164. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. The Court found that the Eleventh Amendment
did not necessarily mean exactly what it said on its face, but rather, stood for the "presup-
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rationale in Hans, the majority noted that state sovereign immunity was
inherent in our federal system of government and that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting
states.'65 The majority then recognized that Congress could abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment in limited situations if the statute expressed clear
intent to abrogate immunity and Congress acted pursuant to a valid exer-
cise of power.'
66
2. Departing from the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
After agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit that Congress showed clear
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the IGRA,16 7 the majority
discussed whether the Indian Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. 168  The majority found that the
Court previously had authorized abrogation pursuant to the Enforcement
position" that the federal system included the sovereign immunity of the states. See id.
The majority recognized that the Eleventh Amendment represented the idea that a state
was a sovereign entity whose immunity was preserved under the Constitution. See id. Fur-
thermore, the majority recognized that a state's sovereignty was extremely important be-
cause it sustained the nature and the balance of the federal system. See id.
165. See id. The majority reconfirmed that the presupposition of sovereign immunity
established in Hans had two parts. See id.; Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. The majority found, first,
that states were sovereign entities in the federal system and, second, that inherent in the
states' sovereignty was the principle that they were immune to suit. See Seminole, 116 S.
Ct. at 1122; Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
166. See Seminole 116 S. Ct. at 1123. The majority analyzed the test established in
Atascadero to determine if Congress's abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the
IGRA was warranted. See id.; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
The Atascadero test required that the IGRA show Congress's clear intent to abrogate and
that Congress act pursuant to a valid exercise of power when enacting the IGRA. See
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122; Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 242. The majority also noted that applying such a stringent test would protect the
Eleventh Amendment against unwarranted abrogation. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122;
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238-39; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
167. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24. The majority found that, on its face, the IGRA
showed clear intent and unequivocal language to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See
id. The majority also found that the IGRA met the unequivocal language test set forth in
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123. The Seminole
Court held the IGRA met the Atascadero test because it showed Congress's clear intent to
abrogate on the face of the statute and because it made numerous references to suits
against a "state." See id. at 1124; see also States' Sovereign Immunity Protected by the l1th
Amendment, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: SUPERFUND, Apr. 11, 1996, at 8 [hereinafter States'
Sovereign Immunity].
168. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1124-25. Before applying the second prong of the abro-
gation test to the IGRA, the Court discussed the petitioners' argument that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar suits demanding injunctive relief rather than monetary relief. See
id. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh
Amendment was not avoided simply because a suit demanded injunctive relief. See id.
The Court found that the relief sought was irrelevant to whether the state can raise a
sovereign immunity defense. See id.; see also Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) (hold-
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate Commerce
Clause, but not the Indian Commerce Clause. 69 The majority acknowl-
edged that the Enforcement Clause empowered Congress to abrogate
state sovereignty because the Amendment expressly dictated that Con-
gress shall enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
states. 170 The Court then acknowledged that abrogation under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause was authorized because states ceded sovereign
immunity to Congress on issues concerning interstate commerce upon
signing the Constitution. 171 Because Congress passed the IGRA pursu-
ant to neither the Interstate Commerce Clause nor the Enforcement
Clause, the majority inquired whether the Indian Commerce Clause was
analogous to the Interstate Commerce Clause to determine whether ab-
rogation under the IGRA was constitutional.
1 72
The majority, therefore, examined the Court's rationale in Union
Gas regarding the Interstate Commerce Clause's grant of power to Con-
gress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. 173 The majority found that,
pursuant to both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Com-
merce Clause, Congress could enact legislation limiting state authority.
1 74
The majority concluded that the Indian Commerce Clause was analogous
to the Interstate Commerce Clause, reasoning that the former was a ple-
nary power similar to the latter.1 7' The majority, however, determined
that congressional abrogation pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause
was only warranted so long as the holding in Union Gas was
ing that the Eleventh Amendment bar applies regardless of whether monetary relief is
sought).
169. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. In Fitzpatrick, the Court authorized abrogation
pursuant to the Enforcement Clause. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 455, 456 (1976). In
Union Gas, the Court authorized abrogation pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989).
170. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. In Fitzpatrick, the Court found that the Enforce-
ment Clause enlarged Congress's powers and diminished states' powers. See Fitzpatrick,
427 U.S. at 455-56. The Fitzpatrick Court thus held that Congress's powers pursuant to
the Enforcement Clause were plenary and, therefore, that Congress could abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment when enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 456; Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
171. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125-26.
172. See id. at 1126.
173. See id. at 1125-26.
174. See id. at 1126-27.
175. See id. The majority found that according to the rationale of the plurality in Union
Gas, the states' cession of sovereignty under the Constitution granted Congress plenary
power to regulate interstate commerce. See id. at 1126; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 17 (1989). According to Union Gas's rationale, a state's cession of authority
under the Constitution included surrendering immunity to suit. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at
1126-27; Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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constitutional.
176
3. Re-recognizing a Limit on Congress's Power to Abrogate
Applying the principle of stare decisis, the majority found that the
holding in Union Gas deviated from the established state sovereign im-
munity precedent before Union Gas was decided and, therefore, that con-
gressional abrogation pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, and
further the Indian Commerce Clause, were unconstitutional. 177 The ma-
jority rejected the rationale set forth in Union Gas, reasoning that the
Union Gas Court inexplicably deviated from the traditional Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence established in Hans.1 78  First, the majority
found that Union Gas's plan of convention theory rationale 179 unconsti-
tutionally empowered Congress under Article I to expand the scope of
the jurisdiction of federal courts under Article III.18° Under the plan of
176. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126-28. The Seminole Court agreed with the petitioner
that if the Court adopted the reasoning in Union Gas then abrogation pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause was constitutional. See id. But instead of holding that the Indian
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to abrogate, the Court reconsidered whether the
decision in Union Gas was constitutional. See id.
177. See id. at 1128. The Court recognized that the principle of stare decisis mandated
an "'evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development"' of the law in reliance on prior
judicial decisions. Id. at 1127 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991), and
noting that reliance on prior decisions contributed to the integrity of the judicial system).
Generally, the majority in Seminole inquired into whether the Union Gas decision devi-
ated from the traditional development of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence since
Hans. See id. For further explanation of the principles of stare decisis, see Jerold H. Israel,
Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 216-19 (noting
the principle of stare decisis "impose[d] a special burden upon the Court"); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 752-53
(1988) (discussing the dangers of judicial reconsideration); Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 600-01 (1987) (discussing the value of stability in decisionmaking);
Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344, 1349-50 (1990) (discussing the
interests served by stare decisis).
178. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1127-28 (concluding that Union Gas was a "solitary
departure" from established law); Sarah Bond, Counterpoint: Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida: A Victory for States Rights; Indian Gaming Act Caught in the Crossfire, MoNT.
LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 21, 22-23 (discussing the Court's rationale in overruling Union
Gas); Smith supra note 163, at 23 (arguing that the Court overruled Union Gas in order to
curb Congress from enacting legislation that would interfere with state sovereignty).
179. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
180. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. The majority explained that before Union Gas,
the Court had never authorized Congress to expand the jurisdictional boundaries of the
federal courts in Article III. See id. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
the Court interpreted the Constitution to bar Congress's authority to amend the Original
Jurisdiction Clause of Article III. See id. at 176-77. The majority found that the Union
Gas plurality had disregarded Marbury and mistakenly interpreted the doctrine of waiver
of sovereign immunity to allow abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole,
116 S. Ct. at 1128; Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
The Seminole majority rejected the reasoning in Union Gas because it authorized Congress
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convention theory, Congress could add to federal jurisdiction set out in
Article III when enacting legislation pursuant to the Interstate Com-
merce Clause. 8 1 Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Mar-
bury v. Madison,182 the Court has prohibited Congress from adding to
the original jurisdiction of federal courts. 183 Second, the majority found
that the Union Gas Court misinterpreted Fitzpatrick, because the lan-
guage of the Interstate Commerce Clause was not so narrowly tailored as
to empower Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity as the En-
forcement Clause."8 The majority overruled Union Gas, concluding
that, while strong, the policy of stare decisis did not justify adherence to
such reasoning.
18 5
In conclusion, the majority held that neither the Interstate Commerce
Clause nor the Indian Commerce Clause empowered Congress to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment and that, therefore, federal courts did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case brought by the Seminole tribe.186 The
Court found that the Eleventh Amendment restricted Congress from us-
ing its Article I powers to circumvent the constitutional limitations re-
stricting the judicial power under Article 111.187 Further, in reaffirming
the principle established in Hans, the majority held that the Eleventh
Amendment acted as a limit on both Article I and Article 111.188
to add to the original jurisdiction of federal courts set forth in Article III and because
states had not constructively waived their right to be sued under the Constitution. See
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
181. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128; see also Savage, Winning Streak, supra note 162,
at 46-47 (discussing the ramifications of overruling Union Gas)
182. 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch)(1803).
183. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
184. See id.
185. See id. In overturing Union Gas, the majority reasoned that Union Gas repre-
sented an anomalous departure from established state sovereign immunity jurisprudence
occurring within the five years since it was decided. See id.; Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddie, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-48 (1993) (citing cases reaffirming
the sovereign immunity principle that, absent a state's consent, it is immune from suits in
federal court). Second, the majority found that the decision was questionable precedent
because a majority of the Court had disagreed with the plurality's rationale. See Seminole,
116 S. Ct. at 1128. Finally, the majority found that Union Gas undermined the function of
Article III by authorizing Congress to add to federal jurisdiction set out in Article III. See
id.
186. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32; see also Bond, supra note 178, at 11-23 (dis-
cussing the rationale behind the Seminole Court's conclusion); State's Sovereign Immunity,
supra note 171, at 8 (predicting the broad ramifications of the Seminole decision).
187. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. In conclusion, the majority stated that even if
Congress had complete law making authority under the Constitution over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment barred congressional authorization of a right to sue a state
by private individuals. See id. at 1131.
188. See id. at 1132. The majority stated that the Eleventh Amendment restricted the
judicial power under Article III, and that Article I could not be used to evade the constitu-
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C. The Dissents: Critiquing the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Both dissenting Justices challenged not only the majority's reasoning
concluding that state sovereign immunity acted as a limit on Article I, but
also its adherence to cases construing the "constitutional" principle of
state sovereign immunity.'89 Justice Stevens argued that the majority
mistakenly relied on an extra-constitutional principle of sovereign immu-
nity, and reasoned that such a principle did not bar congressional abroga-
tion pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. 9 ° Justice Souter
questioned the majority's reliance on the historical principle that the
Eleventh Amendment barred all suits against a state and concluded that
the Amendment only barred suits in diversity, as stated in the letter of
the Amendment.' 9 '
1. Justice Stevens: The Non-Constitutional Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity and the Inability of Congress to Amend Federal
Court Jurisdiction
In his dissent, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's rationale, reason-
ing that the majority improperly relied on an unprecedented non-consti-
tutional principle of state sovereign immunity to limit Congress.' 92 First,
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's rationale was incorrect be-
cause the Eleventh Amendment traditionally limited the judicial branch,
and not Congress. 193 He argued that neither the language of the Elev-
enth Amendment nor the decision in Hans evidenced any constitutional
principle limiting Congress from abrogating the Eleventh Amendment. 94
tional limitations the Eleventh Amendment placed upon the judiciary's jurisdiction. See
id.
189. See id. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Sav-
age, Winning Streak, supra note 162, at 47 (noting that in light of the length and analysis of
the dissenting opinions in Seminole, the struggle over sovereign immunity is likely to con-
tinue into the future).
190. See Seminole, 116 S Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J, dissenting); see also Victoria Slind-
Flor, High Court Gambling Case May Give States Big Payoff, NAT. L. J., July 8,1996, at B1
(noting that according to Justice Stevens, the Seminole decision limits Congress's authority
to provide a federal forum for other types of cases).
191. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 1133-34. Justice Stevens argued that the majority's opinion was flawed
because it found that the Eleventh Amendment limited Article I when precedent had al-
ways assumed that Congress had the power to overcome the Eleventh Amendment. See
id. Justice Stevens asserted that Chisholm, Hans, Fitzpatrick, and Union Gas assumed that
Congress had the power to create a private cause of action against a state in federal court.
See id. at 1133-35. See generally Nowak, supra note 4, at 1414-69 (discussing the distinction
between the congressional and the judicial power to create a federal cause of action against
states).
193. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1137-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 1137-39. Justice Stevens argued that the Hans Court relied on Justice
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Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the majority mistakenly relied
on the common law principle of state sovereign immunity to limit con-
gressional authority.19 He claimed that Congress was not necessarily
limited by an extra-constitutional common law doctrine.196 Thus, Justice
Stevens contended that the majority's rationale was fundamentally
flawed because it relied solely on an extra-constitutional interpretation of
state sovereign immunity, when no constitutional principle of state sover-
eign immunity existed.' 97
Second, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's opinion was incon-
sistent because it recognized a "narrow and illogical" exception to the
Eleventh Amendment, whereby Congress can only add to the jurisdiction
of federal courts set forth in Article III if enacting legislation pursuant to
the Enforcement Clause. 198 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's
finding that Congress may not expand the jurisdictional limits set forth in
Article 111.199 According to Justice Stevens, the majority's opinion was
flawed because it conceded that Congress may not add to the jurisdiction
of federal courts but recognized that the Enforcement Clause granted
Congress authority to amend the Original Jurisdiction Clause of Article
111.211 Justice Stevens recognized, however, that although Congress may
not abrogate state sovereign immunity by adding to the federal courts'
jurisdiction, Congress may overcome it by denying states the right to rely
on the defense of state sovereign immunity.20'
In his conclusion, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should discard
the common law sovereign immunity doctrine2 12 relied on by the majority
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm and on statements made by Hamilton in The Federalist, both
of which assumed that Congress had the power to overcome the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. See id. at 1135, 1141. He claimed that the Hans Court assumed that Congress
could abrogate sovereign immunity by recognizing that Congress could overcome the juris-
dictional bar of state sovereign immunity through legislation. See id. at 1138.
195. See id. at 1138-39.
196. See id. at 1139 (reasoning the common law principle of state sovereign immunity
has the status of mere "presumption," which can be "displaced" by Congress).
197. See id. at 1134 (reasoning that Congress clearly had the power to ensure that a
cause of action could be brought by a citizen of a state against a state).
198. See id. Justice Stevens argued that the decision in Fitzpatrick was flawed because
it recognized that Congress could add to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Article III
pursuant to the Enforcement Clause. See id. at 1142.
199. See id. at 1139, 1142
200. See id. at 1142.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 1142-43. Justice Stevens argued that, given the majority's unprecedented
conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment acts as a limit on Congress, the common law
doctrine on which the court based its opinion should be limited or rejected rather than
expanded. See id. He contended that there was no sound reason for "enshrining the
judge-made" common law doctrine that has no precedential or practical value in the fed-
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to bar congressional authority to abrogate. 0 3 He argued that the doc-
trine was out-dated and served no modern purpose.2 °4 In the alternative,
Justice Stevens found that the Court should have conceded to the doc-
trine of congressional abrogation because the legislature was better
equipped to weigh federalism issues and to consider whether states
should be immune from suit.
20 5
2. Justice Souter: The Legality of Federal Question Suits Against
States in Federal Court and the Implications for the Modern
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, explained that
the majority's state sovereign immunity rationale was fundamentally un-
constitutional as well as historically and illogically misinterpreted.20 6
First, Justice Souter reasoned that the majority mistakenly found that the
Eleventh Amendment barred both suits brought under a federal question
and suits brought in diversity. 0 7 Justice Souter concluded that the Foun-
ders intended the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits in diversity but not
federal question suits.20 8 Basing his conclusion on pre-constitutional de-
bates and the language of the Eleventh Amendment,20 9 Justice Souter
stated that the Founders never intended a sovereign state to be immune
from suits arising under its own laws." 0
Justice Souter found that the belief that the Eleventh Amendment
barred suits in both federal question and diversity contexts originated in
eral system. Id. at 1144. Justice Stevens proposed that the legislature would be better
equipped than the Court to determine if abrogation threatens the federal balance. See id.
203. See id. at 1143-44.
204. See id. at 1142-44; Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.
506 U.S. 139, 151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in Puerto Rico,
Justice Stevens argued that the rationale for the Eleventh Amendment was "embarrass-
ingly inefficient." Id. at 151. Justice Stevens argued that the sovereign immunity defense
was outdated and sacrificed fairness in order to preserve state sovereign immunity. See id.
205. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1143; cf. Herman Schwartz, Supreme Court Opens New
Round in Federal-State Fight, L.A. Tirms, Apr. 7, 1996, at M2 (discussing the federalism
controversy highlighted in the Seminole decision).
206. See Seminole, 116 U.S. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207. See id.
208. See id. at 1167. Because Hamilton addressed the sovereign immunity defense in
diversity but not in federal question cases, Justice Souter criticized the majority's reliance
on Hamilton's discussion of sovereign immunity in The Federalist No. 83. See id.; THE
FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
209. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1152 n.12. Justice Souter reasoned that, as evidenced
by the clear and unambiguous language of the Amendment, the drafters obviously did not
intend to address state sovereign immunity with regard to federal question cases. See id.
210. See id. at 1170-71.
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Hans."'1 According to Justice Souter, the Hans Court misread the Elev-
enth Amendment and common law precedent, mistakenly holding that
the Amendment barred federal question cases as well as diversity
cases.212 He concluded that because the Eleventh Amendment did not
apply to federal question cases, such as Seminole, the Supreme Court
could not bar Congress from creating a private right of action to sue a
state.
2 13
After determining that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply in fed-
eral question cases, Justice Souter addressed whether the common law
doctrine of state sovereign immunity limited the judicial or the legislative
branches.214 Justice Souter explained that allowing sovereign states to be
immune from federal question cases was contrary to our understanding of
a federal government, particularly because the role of the legislature em-
braced a concept of legislative supremacy.1 5 He further asserted that
neither history nor precedent justified a common law doctrine of sover-
eign immunity that barred the judiciary from hearing federal question
cases. 16 Justice Souter, therefore, determined that the majority's opinion
was flawed because neither the Constitution nor the common law barred
congressional authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in federal
question cases.217
211. See id. at 1156-57.
212. See id. at 1156. Justice Souter reasoned that the Hans decision was wrongly de-
cided because the Hans Court was mistaken in holding that the Eleventh Amendment
barred federal question cases brought by a state citizen. See id. He explained that the
Hans Court actually relied on the historical common law principle of state sovereign im-
munity, which was not found in the text of the Constitution. See id. The Hans Court thus
mistakenly relied on a common law doctrine and unjustifiedly integrated it into the text of
the Eleventh Amendment. See id.
213. See id. at 1151. Justice Souter argued that there was no logical reason to explain
why the Eleventh Amendment deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over all suits against
states. See id. Because the plaintiffs in the Seminole case were citizens of the state that
they sued, Justice Souter concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to them.
See id. at 1152.
214. See id. at 1159.
215. See id. at 1170-71. Justice Souter argued that when the new American federal
government was formed, the Framers intended that the federal government's law would
ultimately govern, although two sovereigns would co-exist within the same government.
See id. In light of this consideration, disallowing the federal courts to hear cases against
states that addressed a federal law or question would contradict this system of government.
See id.
216. See id. at 1172. Justice Souter reasoned that the Framers would condemn the ma-
jority's decision in Seminole because it prevented Congress from altering or changing com-
mon law rules, plainly within its power to do. See id. Essentially, Justice Souter contended
that the majority's decision was unauthorized because the Court gave common law rules
constitutional status, giving power to the states at the expense of Congress's power. See id.
217. See id.
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In conclusion, Justice Souter asserted that the Court should neither
overrule Hans or Union Gas in light of the doctrine of stare decisis, nor
extend the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to bar legislative ac-
* 218Hesaewstion. He stated that the Seminole majority was acting outside the
scope of its judicial functions by legislating.219 He reasoned that the ma-
jority was acting as a legislature by extra-constitutionally construing the
Eleventh Amendment as a limit on congressional action, as the Court did
in Lochner v. New York.22° He concluded that because abrogation is a
legislative function, the Court should not limit it.
221
II. RECONSTRUING THE NEW DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Inconsistency of State Sovereign Immunity after Seminole
On the surface, the majority's holding in Seminole appeared consistent
with the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence established in Hans, Fitz-
patrick, and Atascadero; in reality, however, the holding eviscerated the
traditional doctrine it so desperately tried to preserve.222 While the ma-
jority reasonably construed the Eleventh Amendment 223 to continue the
tradition followed by the Court in Hans224 and appropriately overruled
Union Gas, the holding in Seminole ultimately confused the doctrine of
218. See id. at 1184-85. Justice Souter would treat Hans as embracing the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity, even in federal question cases. See id. at 1184. However, he
would not extend Hans, as had the majority, to bar congressional action from abrogating
state sovereign immunity. See id. at 1184-85.
219. See id.
220. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Justice Souter asserted that the majority was acting similar to
the Lochner Court, which reigned in an era where Congress enacted legislation to abrogate
common law economic principles. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1176-77. Like the Lochner
Court, the majority constitutionalized common law principles to bar congressional actions.
See id. Justice Souter explained that like the type of judicial scrutiny found in Lochner, the
majority's judicial practices are unconstitutional. See id. He contended that the Court
should not tolerate this type of decision-making. See id. at 1177; see also Schwartz, supra
note 205 (discussing the effect of the Seminole decision on the federal balance).
221. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1185. Justice Souter argued that the majority should
defer to Congress on all abrogation issues, and should only apply the "clear statement"
rule to determine whether Congress's abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment would be
unjustified. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 160, at 22-23 (discussing the negative effect
of the Seminole decision on tribal sovereignty)
222. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133, (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1145 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also Smith, supra note 160, at 22-23 (arguing the Supreme Court just hap-
pened to "use" the Seminole case to limit Congress from enacting legislation that inter-
fered with sovereign immunity and did not consider the effect on Indian tribes).
223. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment stood for
more than merely the letter of the Amendment; it also stood for the doctrine of sovereign
immunity).
224. See id. at 1127.
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state sovereign immunity rather than clarifying it.225 As Justice Stevens
and Justice Souter recognized, the ambiguity of the Seminole opinion lay
in the majority's construction of the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on
Congress's power.226 Furthermore, as Justice Souter argued, the major-
ity's opinion lacked foundation because it simultaneously prohibited and
allowed congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment.227
1. Unwarranted Construction of a Limit on Congress
First, the majority misconstrued the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on
Congress's legislative powers.228 Before Seminole, the Court had never
construed the Eleventh Amendment to limit Congress's Article I pow-
ers.229 Congress enacted and the states ratified the Eleventh Amend-
ment to limit expressly the federal courts' original jurisdiction set forth in
Article 111.230 Justice Stevens argued that the majority strayed from Hans
by construing the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on any federal action,
whether the action was congressional, judicial, or executive.231 The ma-
225. See id. at 1127-28 (asserting that Union Gas "created confusion" in the lower fed-
eral courts and, therefore, should be overruled); see also Joan Biskupic, High Court's Goal:
Rein in Congress, Empower States, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at A8 (stating that it is
unclear to what extent the Seminole decision will affect all types of suits against states such
as enforcing environmental regulations); Peter S. Canellos, High Court Deferring to States,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1996, at 3 (discussing that the Seminole decision will greatly
restrict lower courts from deciding numerous cases in which a state government is sued);
Savage, High Court Curbs, supra note 149, at Al (discussing the impact of the Seminole
decision on the environment and copyright protection); David G. Savage, High Court De-
cisions May Alter Rules for Making Laws, L.A. TIMES, March 29,1996, at Al, 17 [hereinaf-
ter Savage, High Court Decisions] (predicting the effect of the Seminole decision on
environmental law, bankruptcy law, copyright law, and American Indian affairs).
226. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf id. at 1119 (finding that
the Eleventh Amendment limits both Article I and Article III).
227. See id. at 1133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 1123-25 (holding that the En-
forcement Clause expressly dictates that Congress can intrude on the states' sovereignty
when enacting legislation to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment).
228. See id. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although both Justices Stevens and Souter
found an extension of the Hans doctrine barring congressional abrogation to be unconsti-
tutional, the Justices' reasoning in arriving at this conclusion differed. See id. at 1141 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting), 1177 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that neither the
Eleventh Amendment nor Hans necessarily acted as a limit upon Congress's authority.
See id. at 1141. Justice Souter argued that neither history, precedent, nor reason showed
that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, whether embodied in the Eleventh Amend-
ment or expressed as a common law doctrine, applied to federal question cases such as
Seminole. See id. at 1176-77.
229. See id. at 1134-1142 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 25-26 (1989) (holding that Congress may subject a state to suit to pay environmen-
tal clean up costs under CERCLA).
230. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1137; Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 24 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
231. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1137 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority inappropri-
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jority contradicted itself because it urged strict adherence to the princi-
ples established in Hans, a decision that provided no basis for the
majority's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment barred congres-
sional abrogation. 32 The Hans decision merely addressed the effect of
the Eleventh Amendment on suits brought against a state by a citizen of
that state, and did not discuss the effect of Congress's right to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to its plenary powers.233
Justices Stevens and Souter persuasively argued that the majority's
conclusion, that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, was based on a non-constitutional common law doctrine.234 In
coming to this conclusion, both dissenters pointed to the unconstitution-
ality of the majority's holding.235 They noted that neither the express
language of the Eleventh Amendment, nor other Constitutional provi-
sions, prohibited Congress from creating a federal cause of action against
the states. 36 Thus, by construing the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on
both Article I and III, the Seminole majority confused the doctrine it at-
tempted to preserve.237
2. Inconsistency of the Abrogation Doctrine After the Seminole
Decision
In addition to departing from established sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence by construing the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on Congress's
power, the majority adopted an inconsistent rationale in Seminole, con-
fusing further the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.238 As Justice
Souter convincingly reasoned, the majority's rationale was contradictory
because it was based on conflicting premises: it held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred congressional abrogation and it also found that the
ately characterized the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on both the judicial branch
and Congress. Cf. id. at 1128 (finding that the rationale of established federalism jurispru-
dence extends to a limit on congressional abrogation except when legislating pursuant to
the Enforcement Clause).
232. See id. at 1138.
233. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3 (1890).
234. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1141 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the major-
ity misconstrued the common law doctrine of state sovereign immunity as a constitutional
limit on Congress's authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment), 1166-67 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the majority based its holding on an extra-constitutional princi-
ple, namely, that sovereign immunity extended to suits in federal question jurisdiction).
235. See id. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 1177 (Souter, J., dissenting)
236. See id. at 1144 (Stevens, J. dissenting), 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting)
237. See id. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. See id. at 1141-42. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's reasoning
was flawed because it barred abrogation in all instances but simultaneously condoned a
narrow exception under the Enforcement Clause).
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Enforcement Clause empowered Congress to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment.239 The majority eviscerated its holding by recognizing this
"narrow and illogical exception., 24 ° Marbury v. Madison conclusively es-
tablished that Congress does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts.24' The majority's conclusion lacks foundation because
Marbury did not recognize any exceptions to this rule.242
The majority correctly overruled Union Gas because the Union Gas
Court permitted Congress to unconstitutionally abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment by adding to the jurisdiction of federal courts.243 After
overruling Union Gas, however, the Seminole majority retreated from its
conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress's authority to
abrogate sovereign immunity.244 The majority should have chosen one of
two options.245 Under the first and more reasonable option, the majority
could have construed the Eleventh Amendment as a complete bar against
congressional abrogation by overruling Union Gas, Atascadero, and Fitz-
patrick, each recognizing Congress's authority to abrogate.246 Under the
second option, the majority could have allowed Congress to abrogate in
all instances.247 The majority created inconsistency and incongruity in
the doctrine of state sovereign immunity by construing the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to abrogation and by affirming the narrow excep-
239. Cf. id. at 1128 (finding that congressional abrogation pursuant to the Enforcement
Clause was constitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment contained language that
empowered Congress to limit states' rights). The majority also held that the Eleventh
Amendment limited abrogation pursuant to some of Congress's Article I powers, reason-
ing that Congress may not add to the jurisdictional limits set forth in Article III. See id.
240. Id. at 1134, 1141 (Stevens, J., dissenting) Justice Stevens agreed with the majority
that the Constitution did not authorize Congress to expand the borders of federal court
jurisdiction set forth in Article III. See id. at 1141. Therefore, he concluded that the ma-
jority's reasoning was flawed because it allowed Congress to add to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts under the Enforcement Clause. See id.
241. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (holding that Congress
could not expand the original jurisdiction of the federal courts set forth in Article III); see
also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Constitution in its entirety did not grant authority to sue a state); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-98 (1984) (finding that sovereign immunity
limited the original jurisdiction of the judiciary).
242. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77.
243. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. The majority reasoned that the decision in Union
Gas departed from established precedent by allowing Congress to add to the jurisdictional
bounds of Article III and by adhering to the irrational "plan of convention" theory. See
id.; see also supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text (discussing the principles estab-
lished in Marbury that Congress may never expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
244. Cf. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1142. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Union Gas, 491
U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tion to abrogation under the Enforcement Clause. 48
B. Federalism and the New Eleventh Amendment: A Changed Doctrine
of State Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence
The strict limit that the Court applied on Congress's ability to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment raises issues regarding federalism and separa-
tion of powers.2 49 Although the Seminole majority substantially reduced
the threat that congressional abrogation posed to the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the majority's holding created other dilemmas of great conse-
quence.250 As Justice Stevens reasoned, the Seminole decision created
federalism problems by not clearly defining the extent to which the Elev-
enth Amendment limited Congress.25 1 Thus, the majority created ambi-
guity when Congress was authorized to create causes of actions against
states.2 52 Furthermore, Seminole created separation of powers problems
by construing the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on Congress, thus leg-
islating and acting outside its judicial powers.
2 53
248. See id. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf id. at 1128-32.
249. Cf. id. at 1131 (criticizing the dissents' less expansive review of the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity). Although the Court embraced the traditional principle of state
sovereign immunity, it failed to describe how the limitation of the Eleventh Amendment
on congressional action would affect sovereign immunity jurisprudence. See id.
250. Cf id. at 1131 (finding that although the Eleventh Amendment on its face re-
stricted the judicial power in Article 1II, Congress was not empowered to circumvent that
limitation by abrogating state sovereign immunity); Savage, Winning Streak, supra note
162 at 46-47 (discussing the effect of Seminole on the federal balance); Herman Schwartz,
Supreme Court Opens New Round in Federal-State Fight, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at M2
(discussing the federalism problems that resulted from state sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence after Seminole)
251. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. See id. Justice Stevens recognized that the ramifications of overruling Union Gas
were great. See id. However, the majority's conclusion did far more than merely prevent-
ing Congress from abrogating the Eleventh Amendment; its conclusion also prevented
Congress from providing a federal forum for a myriad of rights of action against states
under copyright and patent laws, bankruptcy laws, environmental laws, and interstate com-
merce laws. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (holding that
Congress could create rights of action against states to pay clean up costs pursuant to CER-
CLA); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (holding that states
could be sued for anti-trust actions); In re Merchants Grain Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit the bankruptcy court from
suing a state); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit against a state university for infringing on an
author's copyright). See generally H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash With Antitrust, Copyright,
and Other Causes of Action Over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37
EMORY L.J. 645 (1988) (discussing the impact of Atascadero on other federal causes of
action).
253. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1176 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Governors Try to
Curb Tribes, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 25, 1996, at 3 (commenting that a federal
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1. Federalism Problems Influencing the Future of the Eleventh
Amendment
The Seminole decision presented federalism issues because the major-
ity failed to address the extent to which the Eleventh Amendment af-
fected Congress's ability to create a federal forum for suits against
states.254 Justice Stevens, for example, convincingly reasoned that the
majority's construction of the Eleventh Amendment affected the circum-
stances under which Congress traditionally created a right to sue a state
in federal court such as in bankruptcy law, copyright law, patent law, and
other federal actions.255 The majority failed to address how Seminole af-
fected Congress's power to provide a federal forum for a broad range of
actions against states in additional subject matters, such as environmental
law and the regulation of the national economy. 256 The majority's con-
clusion that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against states in fed-
eral court leaves no remedy for people harmed by states that violate
federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws.257 The Seminole deci-
sion created questions and issues affecting the status of federally created
rights of action in federal and state courts2 8 which the Court will likely
have to clarify in future opinions.259
court should not have authority to impose its will on a conflict between Indian tribes and
states).
254. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Karen Cordry,
State Governments in the Bankruptcy Courts After Seminole: Are They the New 800 Pound
Gorillas?, 28 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) A2 (May 14, 1996) (discussing how the Seminole
decision could redefine the role of state governments in bankruptcy courts and other simi-
lar federal laws allowing states to be sued in federal court).
255. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. See id.; see also Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 641-
44 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (applying the reasoning of Seminole to a patent action against a state).
See generally Mark Browning, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: A Closer Look, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 10 (1996) (arguing that Seminole will limit Congress's ability to provide a
federal forum for many litigants).
257. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134; see also Slind-Flor, supra note 190, at B2 (discuss-
ing the negative effect the Seminole decision could have on anyone involved with patent
and copyright law); supra note 256 (citing articles suggesting that the Seminole decision
will seriously hamper Congress's ability to create a federal forum for litigants in bank-
ruptcy, intellectual property, anti-trust, and other areas of law).
258. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134. In future opinions, the Court should indicate that
Seminole will not have any effect on other such areas of law such as bankruptcy, other than
those reasonably related to traditional state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Cf Dan
Schulman, Seminole Tribe: Issues in Litigation, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 521 (1996) (dis-
cussing the effect of the Seminole decision on bankruptcy law).
259. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J. dissenting); see also Genentech, 939 F.
Supp. at 642-43 (involving a legal issue of clarification with regard to Eleventh Amend-
ment abrogation and patent law).
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2. Separation of Powers Dilemma and its Effect on Sovereign
Immunity Jurisprudence
The majority's reasoning created a serious separation of powers prob-
lem, in addition to the federalism issues traditionally debated in Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence.2 60 As recognized by Justice Souter, the ma-
jority exceeded the scope of the Court's constitutional powers by ex-
tending state sovereign immunity as a limit on Congress.2 61 As Justices
Souter and Stevens asserted, the majority's conclusion that the Eleventh
Amendment barred Congress's authority to abrogate was founded on an
extra-constitutional common law principle. 262  Similar to the Lochner
Court, the majority "constitutionalized" a common law doctrine to bar
congressional authority over states.263 In overruling Lochner, however,
the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the judicial practice of con-
struing common law as a constitutional limit on Congress. 264
Not until Seminole had the Court subjected legislative power to a
higher level of judicial scrutiny merely because it violated common law
principles instead of constitutional principles.2 65 The Seminole Court was
likely acting without constitutional authority. 66 Furthermore, the Semi-
nole majority prohibited Congress from conducting activities that were
260. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126-27. Justice Souter argued that the majority's deci-
sion was similar to Lochner v. New York because the majority construed a common law
doctrine to constitutionally limit Congress. See id. at 1177 (Souter, J. dissenting); see also
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1652-53 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
Lochner and its restrictive view of Congress's interstate commerce power). In Lochner,
judicial review problems occurred as a result of the Court constitutionalizing common law
notions of liberty and laissez-faire economics. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1652-53. The Loch-
ner Court interpreted the structural limit of the Interstate Commerce Clause by choosing
the legislative means to further a common law economic end, instead of a constitutional
end. See id. Similar to Lochner, the Seminole majority used common law doctrines to
constitutionally limit Congress from infringing upon state authority. See Seminole, 116 S.
Ct. at 1176-77 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,
557 (1923) (finding unconstitutional the abrogation of the common law freedom to con-
tact); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1987) (discuss-
ing the legacy of the Lochner decision on American jurisprudence); supra note 220 and
accompanying text (discussing the Lochner decision).
261. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1176-77 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the major-
ity went beyond Lochner because it not only constitutionalized the common law, but also
supported this assertion by finding that the Enforcement Clause warranted abrogation).
262. See id. at 1142 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1165 (Souter, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1159 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 220 & 260 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the decision in Lochner).
264. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1176-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
265. See id. at 1177; cf West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 381 (1937) (find-
ing that the legislative power was subject to a rational basis standard of review so long as
Congress's actions were within its constitutional authority.)
266. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1177 (Souter, J, dissenting).
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constitutionally intended.2 67 Although a restriction on congressional ab-
rogation was necessary because of the threat to the federal system, the




C. The New Eleventh Amendment and Its Impact on Lower Courts
Seminole's inconsistency, in addition to the presentation of federalism
and separation of powers issues, will have significant consequences on
lower courts. 270 Because the majority failed to define the extent to which
Seminole will affect bankruptcy, antitrust, and copyright actions, lower
courts will likely be confused over the interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment as a limit on Congress.27' Because of a lack of precedent
following Seminole, lower courts will likely differ greatly in interpreting
the Eleventh Amendment's limit on Congress.272 Some courts may inter-
pret the Eleventh Amendment as an absolute bar to all congressionally
created rights of action against states, except as permitted by the Enforce-
ment Clause.273 On the other hand, courts could interpret Seminole to
warrant abrogation pursuant to other constitutional amendments in addi-
tion to the Enforcement Clause.274
267. See id. (contending that it is within the scope of the legislature, not the judiciary, to
legislate).
268. See id. at 1176-77 (arguing the majority overstepped the judiciary's constitutional
authority by constitutionalizing a common law principle).
269. See id.
270. See id. at 1134; see also Kathryn S. Piscitelli, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida:
Can State Employees Still Sue in Federal Court?, 47 LAB. L. J. 211 (1996) (discussing how
Seminole could affect federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under the employment
laws); Savage, Winning Streak, supra note 162, at 47 (discussing the effect of Seminole on
the federal balance and the lower courts).
271. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1143 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Nina Bernstein, An
Accountability Issue: As States Gain Political Power, a Ruling Seems to Free Them from
Legal Reins, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al (arguing that as a result of the decision in
Seminole, states will be less accountable for government wrongdoing).
272. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. See id.; see also Slind-Flor, supra note 190, at BI (arguing that if construed
broadly, Seminole could bar Congress from "requiring states to waive their immunity in
[all] private actions to enforce federal rights"). Compare Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59
F.3d 539, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity
in the Copyright Act and Lanham Act pursuant to the copyright clause), with Genentech,
Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 642-43 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (finding that the
Eleventh Amendment barred a declaratory judgment action against a state university re-
garding the scope of the university's patent).
274. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Lower courts could po-
tentially construe any amendment granting Congress plenary power as a grant of authority
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, such as the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty Third, Twenty Fourth, and Twenty Sixth Amendments. See generally Curtis Mc-
Kenzie, Copyright/Trademark/States' Immunity, 2 No. 9 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 10
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Furthermore, lower courts may have difficulty determining to what ex-
tent the test in Atascadero still applies to abrogation pursuant to the En-
forcement Clause.17 5 Prior to the decision in Seminole, the Court applied
the clear statement test, which required a clear statement of legislative
intent on the face of the statute. 76 In reaction to Seminole, lower courts
may refrain from applying the clear statement test, reasoning that Semi-
nole drastically affected the doctrine of abrogation to the extent that it
rendered the clear statement test inapplicable. 77 Whether in the context
of abrogation or the clear statement test, the Seminole decision fails to
clarify state sovereign immunity jurisprudence for lower courts.
27 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida represents a return to the tradi-
tional state sovereign immunity jurisprudence established over two
centuries earlier, when the Court first recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment protected states from suits in federal court. The Court's ex-
tension of the traditional sovereign immunity doctrine as a limit on the
legislative branch departs from the underpinnings of traditional Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, and confuses the development of warranted
congressional abrogation. By construing the Eleventh Amendment as an
unprecedented limit on the legislative branch, the Court has created a
separation of powers problem, confused the federal balance between
state and federal governments, and reintroduced ambiguity to the lower
federal courts. By expanding the traditional doctrine of state sovereign
immunity, the Court obscured a doctrine that it should have interpreted
conservatively to eliminate any threat presented by unwarranted congres-
sional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment.
Laura M. Herpers
(1996) (discussing the effect of Seminole on copyright and trademark law); Amy C. Wright
& Jeff A. McDaniel, Recent Developments in Copyright Law, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
129 (1995) (analyzing the effect of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence on copyright
law).
275. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985).
276. See, e.g., Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123 (recognizing the clear statement test as a two
part inquiry); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatac, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991) (requiring a
clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40 (estab-
lishing that the clear statement test was met by an expression of congressional intent on the
face of the statute); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979) (requiring a statement of
congressional intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment).
277. Cf. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1140 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing the clear state-
ment cases would have been inapplicable if the Court interpreted Hans to bar Congress's
authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.)
278. See id. at 1133, 1142-45.
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